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Peacekeeping is a relatively new phenomenon that emerged at the end of World 
War I when the League of Nations was chartered to administer the Saar region, a region 
between Germany and France important for its strategic coal reserves that Germany was 
forced to relinquish as mandated by the Treaty of Versailles.  The term “peacekeeping” 
eventually grew to include much more than its original meaning.  The various types of 
peace operations stimulated the need for more accurate terminology to reflect the precise 
nature of the peace mission being undertaken.  By and large this terminology has evolved 
to reflect whether peace operations are undertaken with consent of the warring factions 
and the extent to which peace operations will be carried out.  Today, peace operations 
signify a variety of missions which can be categorized in four basic 
terms: peacekeeping –relatively benign and with consent; peace enforcement –potentially 
hostile and without consent; peace making –diplomatic efforts supplementary to peace 
enforcement, and peacebuilding –the most extensive, i.e. state building. 
Coinciding with the amplification of peace terminology came an expansion in 
reasons for intervention.  International humanitarianism and a swelling sense of 
belonging to a global civil society have redoubled the number of interventions over the 
past decade or so.  Deciding why or when to intervene will remain uncertain and ill 
defined; nonetheless, expanding national interests within an increasingly integrated world 
society remains the primary motivation for intervention. 
The question of how to intervene, though, is fundamentally simple.  An 
intervention should have the ultimate purpose of inducing a populace to believe in its 
government and the system it represents.  Mandating a political structure or running a 
surrogate government does not achieve this.  Rather, intervenors must cultivate 
conditions that would allow for proper political structures to grow.  In essence, the 
overall end goal is to restore and strengthen a responsible, popular, and legitimate 
government.  If a populace does not believe in its government and, equally, in the 
standards of society as set by that government, then an intervention will fail regardless of 




A. CLARIFICATION OF TERMINOLOGY:  PK, PE, PM, PB 
Although a peacekeeping operation is a military operation, it is fundamentally 
different from peace enforcement because it does not need military force to bring the 
combatants to negotiations.  Peacekeepers are present with the consent of all parties 
involved as a military operation to support diplomatic efforts.  Peacekeepers are impartial 
facilitators of truces and negotiated agreements, and act as guarantors to the competing 
parties in a dispute. 
Peace enforcement aims to stop armed conflict by separating combatants under 
duress with internationally sanctioned force or the threat of force.  Unanimous consent 
from the belligerent parties is not required nor has it necessarily been obtained.  Any 
hostile actions against members of the peacekeeping force must be summarily replied to 
with likeminded violence, e.g. military versus military.  Rebuttal with force in kind will 
stabilize the peace process and demonstrate international resolve by demonstrating that 
aggressiveness will not be tolerated, and that the situation will not be allowed to relapse.  
“When a specific incident involves a military attack on international forces, it should be 
responded to in equal measure, not by a ranging foxhunt for the political leader but by a 
carefully planned and targeted strike against a specific unit of his forces.”1 
Although intervenors attempt to retain their neutrality, they typically become 
pawns themselves in the conflict, manipulated by either side against its competitor.  
Eventually, a peace mission will have to choose a stance—not necessarily a side—and 
through military action negate a competitor’s ability to persevere.  It is important to 
remember that in many cases intervenors are sent in to stabilize an elected government, 
which comprises their neutrality from the start. 
Whenever the relentless pursuit of an aggressor’s armed forces ensues, emphasis 
should be placed upon diplomatic efforts in order to lend a political tone to the peace 
mission—and thus try to induce the same within the conflict—rather than playing it out 
entirely in warfare.  The conflict is pursued militarily until combatants’ armed capacity 
diminishes while simultaneous efforts are made to renovate combatants’ movements into 
                                                 
1 William Zartman, “Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa,” in African Conflict Resolution:  The U.S. 
Role in Peacemaking, ed. David Smock and Chester Crocker (Washington, D.C.:  United States Institute of 




political parties.  If no combat is occurring between competitors and no armed 
manipulation via violence is happening, then the process becomes easier and readily 
includes demilitarization and demobilization of soldiers.  Peace-making is the step in 
between peace-enforcement and peacebuilding.  It is the arduous process of mediation 
and negotiation designed to end dispute by establishing prospective resolutions. 
Peacebuilding is the latest development in peace operations.  Peacebuilding 
implements “the institutional, social, economic reforms that can serve to defuse or 
peacefully resolve conflict.”2  Peacebuilding predominantly consists of post-conflict 
actions, chiefly economic and diplomatic that endeavor to rebuild the infrastructure and 
institution in order to avoid degeneration into conflict.  It is a commitment by the 
international community to long-term development to forestall future outbreaks of armed 
conflict.  Peacebuilding reflects the evolving nature of global conflict, exemplified by 
internal crises rather than problems between nations, and as such it focuses on 
determining a viable political process.  Peacebuilding seeks the transformation of 
antagonism through combat into competition through politics.  In other words, 
peacebuilding is: 
Consolidating whatever degree of peace has been achieved in the 
short term and, in the longer term, increasing the likelihood that future 
conflict can be managed without resort to violence.  Further, priority 
should go to the political dimension of conflict and its resolution.  
Although there will be many and various underlying causes of conflict, the 
proximate cause of internal violence is the fragility or collapse of political 
processes and institutions.  The defining priority of peacebuilding thus 
becomes the construction or strengthening of authoritative and, 
eventually, legitimate mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without 
violence.3 
B. FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING 
Steven Metz describes the confluence of three trends which converge to become 
the foundation of modern peace operations:  (a) an immense increase in the danger that 
                                                 
2 Michael Doyle, “Peacebuilding in Cambodia:  Legitimacy and Power” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  
Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado:  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 90. 
3 Elizabeth Cousens, “Introduction” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, 




regional conflicts might spread and escalate, (b) a paternalistic approach to security, (c) 
and a growing sense of interconnectedness and shared humanity.4  Prior to this 
contemporary approach based upon global interconnectedness and extended national 
interests, peacekeeping was quite unsophisticated and had a long road ahead of it to 
become what it is today.  It used to be largely devoid of long-term political objectives 
outside of getting the combatants to the negotiating table to discuss an immediate end to 
hostilities. 
Prior peace missions were triggered only when a government’s capacity for 
governance and maintenance of law and order dissolved.  In early peace operations, 
intervenors were satisfied with addressing only the absence of security and the presence 
of combat, considering the peace mission a success once law and order were established 
and elections held.  Since the peace agreements after World War I, the nature of peace 
missions has developed considerably, from directly addressing security issues to 
implementing a responsible government with the capacity to address those issues itself. 
There were three changes in the course of peace operations becoming what they 
are today.  The first sort was the inclination of impartial nations to become involved in 
other nations’ affairs with the purpose of global stability.  Prior to the Great War, nations 
concerned themselves in another’s affairs for direct, tangible gain.  Before the League of 
Nations, established by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 after World War I, there existed 
no all-encompassing, composite international body organized for the collective good.  
Committed to principles of self-determination, collective security, nonaggression, and 
arms reduction, the supra-national body of the League of Nations immediately stepped 
into the realm of conflict resolution for purposes of the common good.5 
Although not always successful, ad-hoc, nonaligned conflict resolution had 
materialized for the greater good.  The United Nations replaced the League of Nations in 
1946 but retained the League’s mindset to mediate international affairs.  Almost from the 
                                                 
4 Steven Metz, “African Peacekeeping and American Strategy” in Peacekeeping and Peace 
Enforcement in Africa, ed. Robert Rotberg et al. (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press, 
2000), 42. 




outset, the UN interposed itself between warring states, monitoring cease-fires and 
impartially implementing peace accords. 
Although there were several interpositions by the UN prior to its involvement in 
the Suez Canal, most historians consider the United Nations Emergency Force I of late 
1956 to be the first United Nations peacekeeping operation.  The undertaking was a 
success in that pressure by the international community immediately led to the end of 
armed hostilities by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt.  This intercession involved 
United Nations personnel stepping into a situation with the combatant parties’ consent, 
and the warring factions treating United Nations personnel as the neutral party they were. 
Beginning after the First World War with the civil administration of the contested 
Saar region and evolving into the use of military force to consensually intercede between 
combatants, peace operations had grown from its infancy during the League of Nations’ 
time into its new role of peacekeeping.  A supra-national body separated acquiescent 
belligerents, who entrusted the peacekeeper to be an impartial monitor of the truce—one 
without any real enforcement power should violations occur. 
The second advance in peace operations occurred during the United Nations 
Operation in Congo (ONUC) campaign between 1960-64.  The United Nations’ mission 
was to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s transformation from a Belgian 
colony to an autonomous state.  United Nations forces, however, soon found themselves 
in combat, and the role of peacekeeping forces changed with this event.  No longer were 
peacekeeping forces simply a neutral intervening force—the blood of peace troops had 
been spilled and that of their aggressors in turn.  It was now acceptable for peace 
missions to apply force or the threat of force, thus transforming passive peacekeeping 
into pro-active peace-enforcement.  The significant changes were the absence of consent, 
and the application of military force or the threat thereof pursuant to international 
authorization.  In retrospect, of course, the Congo might have provided a good case for 




war.”6  This suggests that international intervenors need to gauge whether their actions 
will ameliorate a conflict or temporarily impair it until it is re-aggravated at a later time. 
The third transformation to occur was that peacekeeping forces would become 
involved in civil conflicts.  Cold War polarization meant smaller nations’ interests were 
subjugated until the end of the East-West rivalry, but afterward latent domestic problems 
arose.  As occurred in the 1960s, when autonomy for Africa’s countries came suddenly 
without their having had any real governing experience, abandonment by Cold War 
imperialists left African governments wobbly and uncertain.  Since politics abhors a 
vacuum, when external support of superpowers withered within Africa, internal 
philosophies and the blossoming of a “politics of survival”7 supplanted it, creating 
unstable political situations characterized by the constant shuffling of bureaucrats, the 
granting of nonmerit appointments, and the use of dirty tricks to preempt competitors 
At the same time, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union 
permitted western societies to reaffirm their commitment to democracy, human rights, 
and civil equality in a more vigorous way when they so chose.  Particular attention was 
paid to democracy and free/fair elections.  Violations of this norm were increasingly 
viewed as potential threats to international order, and so received closer scrutiny from the 
                                                 
6  An army’s business is war, and a nation its employer.  If war is ‘an extension of politics through 
other means’ then careful must be given to whether to intervene when a conflict only involves plausible 
armies—regardless whether they are functionaries of a state or exist as a guerilla force. 
Edward Luttwak described the necessity of war:  “Although war is a great evil, it does have a great 
virtue:  it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.”  He says that an imposed armistice artificially 
freezes a conflict in place, thereby perpetuating a potential state of war by shielding the weaker side from 
being strained to the point of ultimately having to yield and thus bringing about peace in yielding. 
Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to 
negotiate a lasting settlement….  Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further 
suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also 
have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin.  Peace 
takes hold only when war is over. 
For that reason consideration must be given to the condition of whether or not civilians are 
involved and to what extent.  By no means is this prohibiting peace operations from separating armed 
combatants.  There are certainly times when such operations are necessary and quite often welcomed by a 
weak government.  Rather, this idea postulates the necessity of letting war between genuine armed 
combatants play itself out.  A lasting peace can be achieved by exhausting one particular side’s will to 
fight. 
Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs, vol 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999):  36, 37-38. 




international community.  Governmental activities by states that had previously been 
considered matters of internal concern beyond the scrutiny of international law or 
organizations became genuine issues of international concern and action. 
C. PEACEBUILDING:  A MODEL 
Chetan Kumar provides a useful four-step model which can serve as the 
foundation for more detailed approaches to peacebuilding.8  First, a comprehensive 
analysis of the political landscape should occur.  This analysis must include all 
antecedent factors to the current conflict and be completed for each competing 
perspective—individual, clan, community, national, regional and international—in order 
to ascertain gainful political objectives and resource requirements.  Failing to adhere to 
Kumar’s first principle can produce catastrophic results for the peacebuilding process as 
evidenced by the failed peace mission in Somalia in the early 1990s.  The clan-based 
system of Somalia society was initially ignored, which later caused deep trouble for the 
peace mission.  The mission was too narrowly focused—feeding the populace—and the 
operation rapidly succumbed to “mission creep” to include tasks well beyond the original 
plan.  More importantly, the ad hoc and uninformed nature of the peacebuilding mission 
was even more detrimental. 
Kumar’s second step devises a carefully considered strategy which focuses not 
upon prescribing or operating political structures; but rather must identify appropriate 
conditions for these structures to emerge, as well as actions which will stimulate the 
appropriate conditions.  This is a difficult stage because the quickest and most simplistic 
answer is to forcefully emplace the conditions upon the society.  Compelling the 
conditions rather than cultivating them is akin to planting a tree without roots, which will 
topple over as soon as the supports are removed. 
A positive example of this would be the well-devised peace mission in El 
Salvador.  The characteristics of the 12-year civil war that started in 1979 were very 
similar to problems seen today in Africa.  Over a half million people were internally 
                                                 
8 Chetan Kumar, “Conclusion” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. 




displaced, over one million fled to foreign soil, the economy was devastated, political and 
social institutions suffered great reversal due to underfunding and corruption, and there 
was no recognizable government in conflict zones (68 out of 262 municipalities).9  The 
UN entered in 1990 and by identifying and addressing the major root causes of the war 
was able to turn El Salvador into a success story.  “Balancing pragmatism and principled 
action” resulted in El Salvador avoiding a return to war, improving the human rights 
situation, building new institutions, strengthening the economy, and fostering 
democracy.10 
Thirdly, modern peace operations are complex, involving multi-faceted 
organizations and therefore require coordination among the various intervenors to avoid 
contradictory or incompatible implementation.  Purely military operations passed into 
extinction years ago.  Besides several non-military yet governmental organizations such 
as the UN World Food Program or the UN High Commission for Refugees, the 
contemporary world has a plethora of non-governmental organizations eager to assist the 
needy.  In a peace mission all the types of organizations—military, diplomatic, 
governmental aid agencies, and non-governmental aid groups—are very adept at 
successfully carrying out their callings.  Because of the number of sundry outfits present, 
careful coordination and common deference to an overall leader must be made in order to 
avoid mutually negating or even coincidentally destructive activity.  The tactful 
coordination and cajoling of the various benefactors can be one of the most difficult parts 
of the entire peace process. 
In order to uphold and carry on with the positive renovations of the political 
process, Kumar’s fourth step seeks ongoing criticism and feedback, which is continually 
applied toward all of the preceding steps.  Again, perspective from all areas is desired 
such that an accurate analysis can be made of the peacebuilding process’ current situation 
and future direction.  As progress is made, the situation will certainly change from what 
                                                 
9 Robert Orr, “Building Peace in El Salvador:  From Exception to Rule” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  
Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado:  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 153. 
10 Robert Orr, “Building Peace in El Salvador:  From Exception to Rule” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  
Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado:  




was conceived in the original plan.  Therefore, the implementation phase has to be open 
to continual reassessment and adjustment. 
In short, peacebuilding efforts will be most successful if they address a society’s 
ability to manage tensions without resorting to violence.  Peacebuilding takes into 
account the long-term factors that caused the violence but does not seek to remedy them 
as the peace mission’s primary focus.11  “The holding operation of yesteryear has been 
superseded by the multifunctional operation linked to and integrated with an entire peace 
process.  Where peacekeepers once studiously avoided tackling the root causes of armed 
conflict in favour of containment and de-escalation, they are now mandated to seek just 
and lasting solutions.”12  Success will be signaled if the benefactors, especially the 
military and foreign governmental organizations, can depart without disrupting or setting 
back the process.  Constant re-evaluation will encourage and maintain the momentum 
toward the ultimate goal of a self-sustaining political process.  “The end of an 
intervention comes only when lawless forces are imprisoned or disbanded, and when a 
government exists that fully controls its territory, is regarded as legitimate, and has the 
means to prevent civil strife.”13 
D. PEACEBUILDING IN A WARLORD SITUATION 
In a warlord situation, the ultimate criterion for success is a viable and stable 
political process, one in which domestic actors are convinced that their options exist 
purely in the political realm, and expression through force is rendered implausible.  This, 
of course, entails a long, tedious process of transformation.  Factions have to be 
demobilized and converted into nonviolent political movements.  The process must have 
a spirit of credulity to it such that the politicians themselves believe in it.  Only once the 
politicians, i.e. the leaders of the combatants, have settled their differences with votes 
instead of violence will the populace then begin to place its faith back in the political 
                                                 
11 Chetan Kumar, “Conclusion” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. 
Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (Boulder, Colorado:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 185. 
12 Trevor Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping” in Challenges for the New 
Peacekeepers, ed. Trevor Findlay (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996), 13. 
13 Robert Rotberg, “Preventing Conflict in Africa” in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa, ed. 




process and, in this fashion, the government.  In short, the final objective is to strengthen 
a responsible government such that the common people restore legitimacy to it. 
The most effective path to preventing renewed hostilities, then, is 
for international efforts to help a given society build its political capacity 
to manage conflict without violence.  Moving beyond cease-fire to a 
deeper, self-enforcing peace depends on the emergence of social, political, 
and legal mechanisms to resolve conflict authoritatively, though this may 
not always mean democratically…Peacebuilding is not designed to 
eliminate conflict but to develop effective mechanisms by which a polity 
can resolve its rival claims, grievances, and competition over common 
resources.14 
In effect, intervenors convert the problem at hand from a competition waged 
through war to a competition waged through politics.  This is especially true when 
considering collapsed states and their progression towards warlord rule, wherein the 
population has lost its faith in the government.  An intervention cannot focus solely upon 
stopping violence; it must address the absence of political institutions.   
In essence, when intervention does occur it will require a long-term perspective—
beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities—in order to establish a viable political 
system.  Intervenors cannot diffidently stand between belligerents, but must instead 
transform those belligerents into politicians.  This means that warlords will need to be 
debased by having their source of power removed.  Disarmament and demobilization, 
however, should be recognized as a contingent step; not a sufficient goal in and of itself 
Debasing warlords will give intervenors sufficient maneuvering room to bolster 
political stabilization strategies.  Even then, the process does not stop with the first 
election.  Elections are an indispensably vital step, but not the last.  Representatives from 
the international community will have to remain beyond elections as a guarantor of 
human rights, the political process, and an example of international resolve in order to 
vitalize and sustain the process.  Intervenors must become underwriters for the whole 
society and not just the embryonic government.  Reconditioning a government without 
                                                 
14 Elizabeth Cousens, “Introduction” in Peacebuilding as Politics:  Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, 




co-opting the populace is nothing more than icing without a cake—it is sweet and 
pleasing but has no real substance underneath. 
Intervenors will have to act as the “big brother” for the government, both in the 
familial and Orwellian senses.  In the familial sense, intervenors are the backers of the 
government, enabling a fledgling government to foster political competition without 
militant antagonism.  On the other hand, in the Orwellian sense of being a big brother, the 
intervenor will likewise inhibit foul play by the new government and restrain corruption 
and the excessive use of force.  As an underwriter of the new political system, an 
intervenor gives the emerging political society room to agitate without having to resort to 
violence as a means of oppressing the competition. 
In this regard, the political system is separated from personalized politics and in 
its place a new system is established.  This new system permits political challenges to 
authority and peaceful power transfers.  Unlike hegemonic rule, where power 
accumulation is deep but narrow, the new system should be both deep and inclusive.  
Domestic perspectives will be changed from an allegiance to personalities to dedication 
to the political system as an enduring process.  In the end, warlordism must be replaced 
by nationalism.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis examines the events in Sierra Leone, its descent into 
warlordism, and the subsequent international peacebuilding mission.  It outlines the 
process of warlordization while looking at the specific historical roots of Sierra Leone’s 
decline.  Continuing with the historical background, the efforts of the various 
international intervenors will be studied, followed by an analysis of what remains to be 
done for the peace process to be complete.  The overall intent is to discuss the essential 
points of peace missions in warlord situations, using Sierra Leone as the backdrop, in 
order to deduce practical lessons that can then be applied to future interventions. 
Sierra Leone, a West African country slightly smaller in size than the state of 
South Carolina, is an ideal test case because it is a classic example of so many things 




enjoyed early prosperity followed by a rapid downward spiral.  From about 1970 onward 
the course was set for what is now being dealt with:  a country whose governance 
degenerated into warlordism, but is now being restored due to international intervention.  
Its circumstances are ideally suited as a case study to examine international intervenors’ 
prospects of building peace in a warlord situation.  In the appraisal of Sierra Leone’s 
situation, the first step of Kumar’s four-step model—understanding the political 
landscape—is the subject of the next chapter.  This chapter will establish the milieu by 
covering Sierra Leone’s most important historical facts leading toward its warlord 
condition.  It is important to develop a thorough understanding of warlordization so that it 
can potentially be avoided in the first place or, subsequent to that, successfully navigated 
during intervenors’ reconstruction of the country. 
The third chapter examines the second step, international interventions by way of 
a carefully considered strategy.  Sierra Leone will be used as a case study to examine the 
appropriateness of intervenors’ actions, with Executive Outcomes (a private security 
firm), ECOMOG (the military arm of ECOWAS), the United Nations, and Great Britain 
considered as the main intervenors.  The on-going peacebuilding mission is a fitting 
example of what peace operations have evolved into, and the necessary longevity and 
depth of commitment required on intervenors’ parts. 
Because the last two steps, coordination among intervenors and continual 
reassessment incorporating mission feedback, are not yet complete in Sierra Leone they 
cannot be thoroughly analyzed.  With those in mind the final chapter considers the 





II. SIERRA LEONE’S SAGA 
A. MODEL OF WARLORD PROCESS 
This chapter examines the process of a state devolving into warlordism.  It details 
the circumstances particular to Sierra Leone in order to set the background for analysis of 
peace missions specific to this case.  In keeping with the first step of Kumar’s 4-step 
model, for intervenors to respond to warlord situations they must first understand the 
protracted process of warlordization.  The progression is a chain of more or less 
sequential events that can be described by a model:  nationalismÆhegemonic 
regimeÆvenal networksÆshadow stateÆwarlord state.  (See diagram at end of section.) 
Nationalism at independence inflames politics in new states.  Political leaders are 
eager to assert their agendas.  Owing to the fact that these new states have had very little 
experience with sovereign politics, the dominant party behaves toward political 
competitors with little if any cooperation and believes any political concession detracts 
from its power.  It strives to secure its preeminent position by constantly warding off 
competitors rather than building cooperative alliances.  This is what Joseph Migdal calls 
the “politics of survival.”15 
Together with its intransigence, a regime seeks to retain its leading position by 
accumulating power at the expense of the bureaucracy.  This is in large part a response to 
the weak ties between post-colonial institutions and society.  Over time, state institutions 
are enfeebled by an increase of patronage appointments, which has the effect of 
displacing allegiances outside the bureaucracy’s hierarchy and toward the regime leader.  
A leader’s power becomes based increasingly upon his ability to grant non-merit access 
in exchange for political loyalty.  The establishment of informal networks—first based 
upon political favors and later economic ones—accomplishes this personalized power 
concentration.   
The patrimonial networks in reality represent a side-stepping of government as a 
formal process.  Shifting power from within the bureaucracy to personal networks 
                                                 




weakens the state.  The unofficial networks eventually grow to replace the weak state 
with a shadow state that operates parallel to the weak state and outside of formal 
practices.  Actions that once were governed by formal rules and regulations become 
accomplished within informal networks without regard for institutional procedure.  
Eventually, a regime leader exhausts his means to grant further favors—he has 
reached the limits of his venal networks.  He must then find other power bases, which he 
does in the international realm through his control of state resources in the international 
markets.  His new power source is attained through the control of foreign income flows 
into his country and the ensuing distribution of non-merit access in exchange for political 
allegiance.  As the strongman’s politico-economic influence develops, so does the 
political clout he diverts from the legitimate government.  If the state’s bureaucracy is 
institutionalized enough, i.e. if it is strong enough, it might prevent the country from 
disintegrating into warlordism.  If the big man, however, is stronger than the state, then it 
is doomed:  the state’s resources become prostituted for the warlord’s profit. 
The degree to which a person or organization is able to follow a warlord tack 
depends upon how weak the state is.  Some states collapse further than others and it is the 
absence of a measure of institutional control that creates warlord opportunities.  Warlords 
arise from the struggle among individuals competing for influence once held by 
government.  In a weak state there is some small semblance of control that still exists 
independent of regime leaders within the bureaucracy.  In a warlord state, informal 
associations and control of resources completely replace the institutionalized processes, 
thus transferring power entirely to individuals—the warlords. 
In short, warlordization is a progression whereby early politico-economic 
competition among internal state leaders becomes corrupted into conditions promoted 
strictly for personal financial gain.  Warlordization is the struggle within the shadow state 
for control, power, and security.  Allegiances are pyramidically constructed out of 
patrimonial networks—from the top-down in terms of provisioning political/economical 
power and from the bottom-up for obtaining needs once furnished by the state.  In this 




groups through the guise of personalized power accumulation.  Using Sierra Leone as a 
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From its colonial days, Sierra Leone inherited two principal legacies.  First, its 
leaders learned that a convenient way to deal with opponents was through acute force.  
Quasi-judicial force had been applied by their colonial masters upon Sierra Leoneans, 
who then employed the lesson against their own opponents.  Second was the system of 
patrimonialism imposed upon the country as a way of government.  Political challengers 
were placated with extended favors. 
Beginning with their “discovery” by the Portuguese in 1446, the indigenous 
people endured a territorial tug of war among the Portuguese, French, and British over 
the next couple of centuries.16  The British at long last prevailed, somewhat by default.  
Philanthropists established a freedmen’s colony in 1787, which the British government 
later used as a naval base to force emancipation on any slave ships it encountered on the 
high seas.  Re-settling the newly freed slaves within the peninsula colony brought 
together a diverse mixture of people, in contrast to the autochthons on the mainland.  It is 
here that the stage was set for the first fissures in Sierra Leone’s citizenry. 
Creoles as a society flourished.  From the beginning, significant importance had 
been placed on schools, with the first school opened in 1792.  Another school, opened in 
1815, was upgraded and relocated a few times until it was finally situated at Fourah Bay 
on the peninsula and later became Fourah Bay College, a university-level institution.17 
Aided by their high education levels and European mortality given the infectious 
tropical climate, Freetown Creoles began to occupy increasingly important colonial civil 
service posts throughout West Africa.  This society of shopkeepers and public servants 
was in strong contrast to the agricultural colony intended by the original settlers.  The 
ability and ambition of the Creoles of the Freetown Peninsula resulted in their obtaining 
leading roles in government service and trade throughout West Africa, such as in Liberia, 
the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and The Gambia.  Because of its elevated cultural status, 
Freetown became known as the “Athens of West Africa”. 
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In 1884 and 1885 the Conference of Berlin began the allocation of West Africa by 
entente.  By 1888 European powers had divvied up all of West Africa, which solidified 
by default Sierra Leone’s future borders even though Great Britain was reluctant to get 
involved with the Sierra Leone mainland.  In large part due to a more imperialistic 
parliament in Britain, on August 31, 1896 Sierra Leone’s governor Fredrick Cardew 
declared the mainland a “Protectorate” directly under British control.  Sierra Leone now 
consisted of the “Colony” on the peninsula and the “Protectorate” on the mainland, 
divided as much by culture and custom as by geography.  In due time these two groups 
would develop into political competitors—the Creoles lived in the Colony and the 
Protectorates on the mainland. 
This friction manifested itself in the Hut Tax War during the final years of the 
nineteenth century when the natives of the mainland Protectorate attacked Creole traders 
and Whites, and were then consequently targeted by the British troops protecting the 
colonists and the colonial administration’s policies.  The natives rebelled at this tax, 
imposed to pay for administrative costs, as a symbol of British oppression.  In the six 
months it took British forces to regain control, over one thousand Creoles and Whites 
were killed by the native Mende and Temne.  Over two hundred of the chiefs involved 
were arrested and at least eighty-three hanged.  The Protectorate’s rebellion was the first 
spark of organized nationalism, as people in the Protectorate strained at the restraints 
placed on them by their colonizer. 
The overall outcome of the Hut Tax War was a sort of two-way repulsion.  The 
natives of the interior now firmly resisted the “Creolization” that had been creeping 
inward.  At the same time, the British no longer trusted Africans, Creoles among them, 
and from about this point forward appointed only British to interior posts of importance.18  
“So it came about that by 1912 Africans in Sierra Leone, for example, held only one in 
                                                 






six of the senior official posts, whereas as recently as 1892 they had still held nearly half 
of those posts.”19 
Furthermore, the Hut Tax War provided the British with the opportunity to 
impose political structure upon the Protectorate.  The British created an all-inclusive 
hierarchical system of chiefs where none had previously existed.  The British compelled 
the native groups to subordinate themselves to “paramount” chiefs who were chosen by 
the British from among the most important groups because of their loyalty to the British.  
Subchiefs were then compelled to answer to Paramount Chiefs.  The Paramount Chiefs 
were liable to the colonial administration, and if their actions— no matter how legitimate 
from the chief’s point of view—did not coincide with the desires of the administration, he 
was often but not always summarily dismissed and replaced by a more “cooperative” 
chief:  a sycophant who was willing to toady himself to the administration, even to the 
detriment of those he was representing.  In exchange, the truckler would receive personal 
enrichment of one form or another.  This design made patrimonialism throughout the 
territory, especially within the Protectorate, routine.  
The 1930s would mark the next profound set of changes for Sierra Leone, such as 
a strong economic transformation away from tradition.  The Great Depression saw a drop 
in the demand for Sierra Leone’s agricultural products, but the discovery of diamond 
deposits in 1930 and the opening of a large iron mine in 1933 countered this decline.  By 
1938 the two mineral deposits accounted for 65 percent of the country’s exports.20 
In 1937, in a move designed to bring the populace more under government 
control, Sierra Leone adopted the same administrative system as was in place in another 
British colony, Nigeria.  The chiefs were deemed salaried officials.  Salaries replaced 
their traditional sources of income and additionally burdened them with the responsibility 
of providing local services paid for from taxes collected in the locality.  Consequently, 
they were thus further removed from being chiefs over their people and instead became 
bureaucrats, as the government unsuccessfully attempted to co-opt the populace, i.e. the 
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chiefs’ subjects, more directly beneath it.  Many chiefs, however, were resistant to these 
changes, which was implemented only piecemeal throughout Sierra Leone.  They were 
therefore able to defend some of their traditional authority and thus retain a local-level 
organization somewhat separate from that of the government.  To illustrate how resistant 
the chiefs were to being drafted into the government, as late as post-World War II only 
half the chiefdoms had official treasuries.21 
Educated autochthons also appeared in the 1930s.  The sons of chiefs had been 
among the first to be educated and now, grown up, they began taking part in the politics 
and administration that their fathers had been warding off.  One of the first Protectorate 
men to assert his rights was Milton Margai, who would later become Chief Minister in 
1953 and the first Prime Minister in 1960.  From the outset he was a Protectorate activist 
who campaigned for the Protectorate to be placed on an equal footing with the Creoles’ 
colony.   
Margai was instrumental in Sierra Leone’s self-governance, having organized a 
council of chiefs and elites that met annually beginning in 1940.  This council, known as 
the Protectorate Education Progressive Union (PEPU), was a conglomerate of 
Protectorate elites whose purpose was to educate their compatriots in the Protectorate 
about their political and civil rights.  It was, however, more or less only an unofficial 
council.  In 1946, under Margai’s leadership and in cooperation with John Karefa-Smart, 
the Sierra Leone Organization Society was established.  Known as “SOS” and composed 
of Protectorate elites such as the educated and chiefs, this society was the first true 
organized political voice for the Protectorate.  “Essentially conservative, it was based on 
an alliance between chiefs and educated hinterlanders, two groups who were closely 
related by family ties.”22 
By 1947 there were basically four different interest groups in Sierra Leone:  
Creole settlers, Protectorate chiefs, Protectorate elites, and Protectorate commoners.  The 
Creoles aligned themselves under the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone 
(NCSL).  In the Protectorate the SOS allied itself with the chiefs to form the Sierra 
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Leone’s People’s Party (SLPP), which was under Margai’s leadership.  “From the end of 
the nineteenth century until independence, the most divisive ethnoregional conflict pitted 
colony Creole elites against Protectorate African elites.  The Creoles, separatist in their 
political attitudes and aspirations, rejected political equality with protectorate Africans 
and the latter resented both the assertion of superiority by Creoles and their relative 
dominance in local politics prior to decolonization.”23  (Because Creoles were 
concentrated on the peninsula they consequently dominated municipal politics in the 
country’s capital.)  Sierra Leoneans had become politicized in large measure. 
The 1950s saw development of party politics, future leaders, and riots.  The SLPP 
continued to be the controlling faction within Sierra Leone, but Protectorate commoners 
felt increasingly alienated from the objectives of the SLPP and from their chiefs.  
Widespread rioting in 1955-56 resulted from an increase in taxes, which was an SLPP 
decision implemented by the chiefs.  The SLPP could have successfully defended the 
increase by pointing the finger of public attention at the chiefs, being the bureaucrats 
responsible for levies within their chiefdoms.  Unfortunately, the SLPP failed to take 
advantage of the riots as an excuse to politically distance itself from the chiefs. 
Dissatisfied with SLPP, some of its younger leaders joined forces under the 
leadership of a moderate Creole, Cyril Rogers-Wright, to form the United Progressive 
Party (UPP) in 1956.  UPP consequently suffered from the perception that it was nothing 
more than a Protectorate mask worn by a Creole party.  Although it never was able to 
gain broad-based support, the UPP did manage to win some seats in the 1957 elections.  
It gained five seats but was written off as too Creole-led to be effective.24 
After the elections, another group hived off from the SLPP to form the People’s 
National Party (PNP).  By a single-vote margin Albert Margai was elected to lead the 
SLPP in place of his brother Milton, but later stepped down after Milton promised that 
Albert’s ally, Siaka Stevens, would be returned to the cabinet.  This gesture was another 
early example of extending favors to assuage political challengers, but it did not fully 
work.  It was Milton’s failure to honor this and other pledges, along with Albert’s more 
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progressive ideology, that triggered Albert to form the PNP in 1958—a short-lived 
alliance that would further evolve into other political parties.25 
 
Party Name (date) Leader Support base Platform 
SLPP (1951) Milton Margai • Protectorate educated elite 
and Paramount Chiefs 
• Mende (southerners) 
• Advancement of the 
Protectorate 
NCSL  • Creole • Protection of the 
Colony 
UPP (1956) Cyril Rogers-Wright • Moderate Creoles and 
younger SLPP 
 
PNP (1957) Albert Margai 
Siaka Stevens 
• UPP and younger, more 
progressive SLPP 
• Dominated by Mende 
• Close to the chiefs 
• Northern commoners 
• Less well-connected and 
less well-educated 
townsmen 
• More nationalistic 
policies 
• More rapid social 
change 
• More rapid progress 
toward 
independence 
• African control of 





Tamba Mbriwa • The Kono farmer • Focused exclusively 
on the Kono 
commoner 
APC (1960) Siaka Stevens • Northerners (initially) 
• Commoners 
• Socialism 
• Need to curb chiefs 
NDP (1970) Ibrahim Taqi • Younger, more radical APC 
members 
• Anti-communists 
UDP (1971) John Karefa-Smart • NDP 
• Temne 
• Anti-Stevens 
Table 1:  Early Political Parties 
C. NATIONALISM 
The nationalist regime in power at independence, the new but formal-process-
building regime, is the starting point for possible state collapse.  The beginner-
government under the charge of the nationalist regime is too inexperienced to be secure 
with political opposition.  Even though greater collaboration is called for, the nationalist 
regime in charge instead rebukes the opposition rather than negotiate with it.  The 
opposition is either co-opted, and thus eliminated, or it reacts with ever-increasing fervor, 
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more or less equal to that to which it is subjected, and the competition escalates.  As one 
side counters the other’s move, the struggle for government intensifies.   
It should be recalled, however, that imperialists introduced political restrictions as 
a way of dealing with earlier nationalist challenges.  Even before reaching the starting 
block of an autonomous government, the nationalists had been taught that the best way to 
deal with a government’s exigencies is to silence enemies through persecution, exile, 
imprisonment, or execution.  The combination of the political system lacking lengthy 
temporal legitimacy as an adhered-to formal process, combined with the inexperience of 
the controlling faction and its uneasiness in dealing with opposition, engenders heavy-
handed behavior, which consequently sets the stage for the emergence of hegemonic 
regimes.  The nationalist regime in control clings to the power it has, believing itself to be 
overly vulnerable.  By doing this it severely hinders the development of the government 
as a legitimized institution, and also chokes off healthy political competition. 
The up-and-coming political parties that developed during the few decades before 
independence in Sierra Leone epitomized the tension between Creoles and Protectorates, 
as did the harsh methods the colonial administration used to suppress it.  By 
independence, however, the Creoles came to recognize the electoral supremacy of the 
hinterland and realized they must align themselves with hinterland-based parties in order 
to exert political influence.  Similarly, the hinterland based parties recognized the value-
added that the Creoles brought with them; namely, wide-ranging access to the civil 
service, judiciary, and professions.26 
In early 1960 Great Britain began talks with the ruling SLPP party to discuss 
independence for Sierra Leone.  Many, however, were opposed to the SLPP’s platform of 
post-independence elections instead of elections held beforehand.  In March of 1960 
Milton Margai eliminated the opposition’s grumbling by building a coalition before the 
final pre-independence constitutional conference.  This umbrella coalition, the United 
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National Front, presented a common front to Great Britain at the upcoming conference, 
thus satisfying Great Britain’s requirements for its colony’s independence.  Designated as 
Prime Minister, Milton had promised ministerial appointments to opposition leaders in 
return for their cooperation, another clear case of trying to oil squeaky wheels. 
At the same time, a new quarrel crystallized around one man in particular.  Being 
concerned that the government’s configuration would be cemented in place upon 
independence, Siaka Stevens insisted on having a plebiscite before independence to 
reorganize the government.  When that did not come to fruition he promptly vocalized his 
objections and gained immediate widespread support.  The lines were drawn between 
Margai’s Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and Stevens’ All People’s Congress (APC).  
Sierra Leone’s main political dichotomy between the Protectorates and Creoles was thus 
configured into one between opposing nationalist factions. 
It should be noted that at this point Stevens was simply organizing a group of 
people within the SLPP sharing the same political viewpoint on nationalism—that the 
government should be reorganized before independence.  It was not until the SLPP 
resisted the idea of governmental reorganization that Stevens’ splinter group hived off 
and found fairly widespread initial support.  The SLPP, in essence, was too inflexible in 
defending its lead role in the government at the time of independence.  The main political 
personages had for the most part been pacified, save for Stevens.  In this sense, the 
SLPP’s unwillingness to compromise created what would become its most troublesome 
political competitor, the APC. 
The SLPP granted no political leeway to the APC on the issue, irritating APC 
followers to the point of violence.  Riots broke out protesting the lack of elections.  
Beyond completely abandoning the progress toward Sierra Leone’s self-governance that 
had been made, Great Britain had no other course but to press on.  A state of emergency 
was declared to restore order.  Forty-four APC leaders, including Siaka Stevens, were 
jailed in March.  They were released a month after Sierra Leone was granted 
independence, which came on April 27, 1961.  Their imprisonment served as a final 
colonial reminder to Sierra Leone’s first government, with the SLPP in charge, that the 




Although several other political parties came into being, the succeeding decades 
would witness the continued of the SLPP/APC struggle in Sierra Leone’s politics.  Upon 
his death in 1964 Milton’s brother Albert Margai replaced him as Prime Minister and 
SLPP leader.  Albert was not as skilled a politician as Milton, and compounded his 
difficulties by openly pushing for a one-party state, and trying to concentrate power 
further into his own hands and those of his close associates within the party.  As a result, 
the SLPP found its popularity declining in the APC’s favor, which the 1967 elections 
showed. 
Albert Margai tampered with the electoral machinery with the aim of ensuring his 
own return, but did not manipulate the system enough to assure his reinstatement.27  The 
elections were held in two phases.  The first phase on March 17 selected the popularly 
chosen members from the various political parties for the slightly enlarged House of 
Representatives.  The second phase, to occur on March 21, was to determine which 
Paramount Chiefs chosen by the district councils would win the additional 12 seats 
reserved for them. 
The SLPP won twenty-eight seats to the APC’s thirty-two, but six independents 
yet held the determining balance.  Furthermore, the twelve Paramount Chiefs’ seats were 
still a factor as well.  When four of the independents indicated their opposition to the 
SLPP, Governor-General Henry Lightfoot Boston—a Creole earlier appointed by Milton 
Margai—swore in the APC’s Siaka Stevens as the new Prime Minister on March 21 
without awaiting the results of the Chiefs’ elections which could have still determined a 
different majority winner.  Perhaps Boston had assumed the chiefs’ compliance with the 
winning party (APC) because “chiefs as administrative agents have to act in concert with 
the government of the day.”28 
At this point three consecutive military interventions occurred.  These actions can 
be identified as “seesaw coups” that winnowed the competition in a game of attritional 
politics.29  At the behest of Albert Margai, the military commander of Sierra Leone’s 
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1,200-soldier army, Brigadier General David Lansana, arrested Stevens and declared 
martial law on the pretext of needing to await the outcome of the Chiefs’ election and 
claiming that the constitution had been thus violated.30  Lansana then mandated a meeting 
to occur on March 23 among all the newly elected, including the Chiefs, to vote on their 
choice of Prime Minister. 
It should be noted that Lansana had close family ties to Margai through Lansana’s 
sister-in-law, a cabinet minister in Margai’s government.31  Also of special note is that 
the coup would not have been possible without the assistance of Lieutenant Samuel 
Hinga-Norman, who was then the aide-de-camp to the Governor General.32  Hinga-
Norman initiated the coup by refusing to let the Governor General hand over power to the 
elected official. 
The response to this coup was intense.  On March 23 a group of senior army and 
police officers arrested Lansana and formed what they called an interim government 
named the National Reformation Council (NRC).  Meanwhile, Stevens fled into 
neighboring Guinea.  The NRC’s proclaimed objective was to avoid violence and 
investigate the SLPP government’s corruption and inefficiencies—but without the 
“limitations” of a democratic political process.  NRC would then return the government 
to civilian rule. 
The NRC, though, never won the support of the chiefs or the educated civilian 
elite (SLPP’s power base), and also alienated commoners (APC’s power base) by placing 
too much reliance upon the very civil service NRC was supposed to be investigating for 
corruption.  A year later, on April 17, 1968 a revolt among the army’s noncommissioned 
officers and enlisted men ended the NRC’s rule.  Nearly all officers and ranking police 
were jailed.  Nine days later, Siaka Stevens returned from exile, along with other 
ostracized APC leaders, and was sworn in as prime minister.  “But Stevens’ accession did 
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not restore the government’s responsiveness to hinterland electoral pressures so much as 
enable a new regime…to gain access to the sources of control.”33 
This synopsis of events confirms a lack of formalized politics.  In the few short 
years since its independence Sierra Leone had diverged from instituting an enduring 
political system that incorporated inherent and self-enforcing respect for its procedures.  
In its place personalized power struggles played out via political favoritism that served to 
severely weaken the government as an institution.  Equally important, Sierra Leoneans 
were introduced early on to the idea that politicking was not limited to politicians—the 
army could play whenever it wanted.  Unfortunately, this would serve as a poignant 
precursor of events to come. 
D. HEGEMONIC REGIME 
The first step toward state collapse suggests that political structure as a formalized 
process had insufficient time to take root.  This step represents the metamorphosis of the 
nationalist regime into a purely hegemonic one, or the appropriation of power by a 
prospective hegemonic regime.  Given intensifying political efforts, rival regimes 
eventually become exclusionary power-hungry ones, in quest of asserting dominion over 
others.  If and when one emerges as dominant to assume the hegemony, the next step 
toward state collapse has been taken. 
A hegemonic regime transfers power from the government to the people of its 
inner circle as a means of self-preservation.  In other words, the regime makes its leaders 
inseparable from government as a way to stave off competitors and protect its power.  
The act of personalizing power destabilizes the government by undermining the 
citizenry’s belief in governance as a formal process.  This marks the transition to a 
hegemonic regime. 
In the months after the countercoup in April 1968, when the “Anti-Corruption 
Revolutionary Government” returned Stevens to power, the fragile peace between the 
APC and the SLPP began to fall apart with both sides accusing the other of instigating the 
NRC coup.  The APC continually strengthened its governmental control, while SLPP 
                                                 




supporters expressed resentment in riots throughout the SLPP’s southern strongholds.  To 
add insult to injury, in elections that same year twenty-six of the twenty-eight SLPP 
members elected to parliament were declared by the courts to have been improperly 
elected.   
The unrest in the south peaked in November of 1968 during elections held to fill 
the vacated SLPP seats.  Consequently, the APC government declared a state of 
emergency which granted it broad powers of arrest and detention without trial.  The 
government promptly used its fortified power to imprison members of the opposition.  
More than ninety SLPP politicians, including the new leader Jusuf Sherif, were held from 
November 1968 until the state of emergency expired in February 1969.  The APC had 
remembered well from when its members were incarcerated years earlier that extra-
judicial imprisonment was a convenient method to deal with competitors.  In so doing it 
was strengthening its role as a hegemon in general, and winnowing Stevens’ political 
competition in particular. 
The APC’s influence continued to increase and Stevens’ along with it.  In January 
1969 Stevens announced plans to formalize Sierra Leone’s severance from the crown in 
order to become a republic.  This strategy would convert the governor-generalship into a 
presidency to be occupied by the leader of the ruling political party.  Many, however, 
feared that such a process would grant Stevens too much executive power at the expense 
of weakening the rest of the government.  In an ironic twist of fate, Albert Margai had 
initiated the move toward a single party state in 1967.  Margai was only partially 
successful, though, in that the motion required approval by two different parliaments.  
Although Albert Margai and his SLPP were unseated before reaffirming the proposal 
with a second parliamentary vote, the stage was set for the APC’s benefit. 
In September 1970, apprehension about Stevens’ potentially enormous 
presidential powers caused members to break with the APC.  John Karefa-Smart, who 
had been out of the country for the previous several years while serving at a United 
Nations posting (an example perhaps of political shuffling to distance potential rivals), 
accused Stevens of failing to lead the country and of trying to assume dictatorial powers.  




party, the United Democratic Party (UDP).  The formation of new political parties was a 
clear example of other hegemonic hopefuls vying for the top.  “The Sierra Leone 
system…depended not on any single group with a strong vested interest in maintaining 
the existing structure, but rather on a balance between competing groups each of which 
hope to achieve some of its objects through it.”34 
The UDP concentrated on dethroning Stevens by capturing his basis of political 
support; specifically among the Temne in the north.  Although Stevens was a Limba (at 
the time the third largest group comprising 10% of the population, behind the Mende’s 
and Temne’s 30% each35) his political strength resulted from his support by Temnes.  
Mounting resentment towards Stevens’ emergent presidential powers and the 
depreciation of his political support base triggered Stevens to declare another state of 
emergency.  In addition, he also accused the UDP of being financed by foreign interests 
worried about Sierra Leone expropriating a majority concern in British mining companies 
operating in Sierra Leone. 
UDP supporters demonstrated their growing frustration when they reacted to these 
events with violence, attacking APC offices and other government targets in the north 
and Freetown.  The government forcefully suppressed the violence, banned UDP and its 
newspapers, and jailed sixty-six UDP leaders.  Outside of Sierra Leone, supporters of the 
UDP and the SLPP joined forces to form the National Liberation Movement in 
opposition to the APC.   
Additionally, on October 13, 1970 the government arrested twelve soldiers for 
allegedly plotting another coup.  These twelve were noncommissioned officers and 
warrant officers, to include Warrant Officer Alex Conteh—a major player in the April 
1968 coup that overthrew the army officers’ NRC, restored Stevens to power, and 
returned Brigadier Bangura as head of the army.  The main organizers of this 1970 coup 
were sentenced to death.  In January 1971 Stevens traveled to Guinea to establish an 
initial agreement of mutual security with Guinean President Touré.  Impelled by this, but 
also with other intentions, a drunken army major led a very clumsy attempt to assassinate 
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President Stevens on March 23, 1971.  The president’s guards repelled this wayward 
army unit’s attack, along with a second attempt at noon.  Brigadier Bangura took charge 
of the rebel forces later that day and continued the rebellion, but loyal government forces 
suppressed the uprising.  Four of the eighteen military men implicated in this failed coup 
were sentenced to death, with Bangura among them.  Their executions by firing squad a 
few months later, in June 1971, were the first capital punishments to be carried out.  Even 
those responsible for the 1967 coup were still in jail. 
With the aim of fortifying his personal control, Stevens flew to Guinea to sign a 
mutual defense pact on March 25, 1971.  As a result, two hundred Guinean troops took 
up residence in Freetown as his presidential guard, a safeguard against Stevens’ own 
chaotic army.36  (The last Guinean guards did not leave Sierra Leone until mid-1973.)  
Stevens had sought international assistance in producing a personal praetorian guard 
whose loyalties were strictly to the president and not to the country of Sierra Leone. 
Once Stevens became president in April 1971, he made speeches, with undertones 
of a push toward a single-party state, about the voluntary amalgamation of the existing 
parties while at the same time he worked to make life difficult for APC’s main 
opposition, the SLPP.  In the 1973 by-elections, for example, many SLPP members were 
physically prevented from filing their nomination papers.  Of those who were able to file, 
twelve were declared to have improperly done so and their applications were therefore 
annulled.  In response to this treatment, the SLPP boycotted the elections entirely.  As a 
result, the APC won ninety-nine of the available one hundred seats (with one seat 
remaining vacant), and Sierra Leone became a de facto one-party state.  Regrettably, 
boycotting the elections only served to help the APC. 
It was at this point that the government sought to gain SLPP support via 
reconciliation efforts.  All of the leaders (largely SLPP-oriented) of the 1967 and 1968 
military coups were set free in 1973.  This was not the first time opposition leaders had 
been released.  In February 1972 the government liberated twenty-eight jailed UDP 
leaders.  Despite this attempt to appease the opposition, a state of emergency remained in 
force.   
                                                 




This measure was proved prudent given another attempted coup in January 1974.  
While President Stevens was out of the country the acting Vice-President, Christian A. 
Kamara-Taylor (then Finance Minister), survived an attempt on his life.  Fifty-five people 
were arrested, most of whom were associated with the previously banned UDP rather 
than the SLPP.  Twenty-four were tried, twenty sentenced to death, and eight were 
actually executed.  Those sentenced to death included Brigadier General David 
Lansana—instigator of the first coup in March 1967, Lieutenant Colonel A. Juxon-
Smith—chairman of the subsequent NRC coup, and Private Morlai Kamara—a leader in 
the 1968 coup that overthrew the NRC and returned control to civilians. 
In March 1976, Parliament elected Stevens to his second and, according to the 
constitution, final five-year term.  Growing dissatisfaction with Stevens’ government 
materialized into student demonstrations in January and February 1977.  The APC’s 
counter-demonstrations devolved into rioting that sparked additional violence throughout 
the country.  Declaring another state of emergency, Stevens used considerable force to 
suppress the situation.  It was plain to see that the political opposition was accustomed to 
violence as the government’s means of exhibiting political might.  Equally, the party in 
power did not hesitate to escalate the conflict via its own violent demonstrations.  Such 
use of violence has been described as a way to maintain subordination and allegiance,37 
and violence played a persistent role in Sierra Leonean politics: 
The Stevens government after 1968 made the most systematic use 
of detentions…On occasions…the government showed itself prepared to 
exercise whatever coercion was necessary to stay in power, and to 
suppress the opposition violence which resulted…What is clear is the 
continued role of violence [force used against the government] and 
coercion [force used by the government] in Sierra Leonean central 
politics.38 
In the general elections held in May 1977, the APC again won.  The APC had 
grown stronger in the SLPP’s absence because it was able to court favor among 
subgroups without having to worry about the SLPP counteracting its political 
                                                 
37 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1985), 35. 




maneuvers.39  Even though the SLPP participated in the current elections it only managed 
to gain fifteen of the one hundred seats.  Again, displeasure with the process was 
manifested in violence and allegations of electoral infractions. 
Stevens was finally able to officially make Sierra Leone a one-party state in 1978, 
and “a personality cult developed around Stevens.”40  The diminutive numbers of SLPP 
MPs were unable to mount any significant opposition to the June constitutional 
referendum, which concomitantly proscribed the SLPP.  When the House of 
Representatives reassembled, the new single-party constitution forced the former SLPP 
members to either resign or cross the aisle. 
The democratic, decentralized system that initially existing [sic] 
upon Independence was progressively dismantled, culminating in a highly 
centralized regime that did away with local government and imposed one-
party rule in 1978, concentrating power and resources in Freetown, 
disenfranchising the populations, and depriving the rural population of 
infrastructure, education and health care.41 
The first single-party elections were held in May 1982.  Even these were still 
spoiled by violence when at least fifty people were killed as a result of vicious 
campaigning.42  Earlier having suggested that he would step down as early as the 1982 
election, Stevens held onto his presidential powers and, in fact, did not retire until the end 
of 1985. 
Stevens had at last succeeded in formally strengthening his individual control 
over the government and its resources.  Moreover, he did so at the expense of 
participatory politics.  Anyone who wanted to participate in the government, including 
bureaucrats, had to be a member of the political party over which Stevens reigned.  
Rather than diminishing political quarrels, single-party rule weakened the system of 
governance by pushing political differences into the dark where they festered.  Stevens 
had succeeded in transforming his hegemonic APC regime into one of personalized 
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power—those who wanted to play a part now officially had to court Stevens’ favor rather 
than be able to be engaged in participatory politics. 
E. VENAL NETWORKS 
When a hegemonic regime devolves into venal networks the state itself is 
progressively debilitated.  Its citizenry, instead of looking to the government for action 
and assistance, turn to power figures.  The more a hegemonic regime hoards power, the 
more the state begins to fall apart, thereby creating a seedbed for warlords.  The way a 
hegemonic regime holds on to its power is by distributing public resources in return for 
political loyalties. 
In a situation where the state is the principal employer of labour 
and almost the sole provider of social amenities, and where a personal 
ambition for power and wealth and influence rather than principle 
determines political affiliations and alliances, power to dispense patronage 
is a very potent weapon in the hands of the President, enabling him to gain 
and maintain the loyalty of the people at various levels of society.  Loyalty 
of this type secured by patronage produces an attitude of dependence, a 
willingness to accept without question the wishes and dictates of the 
person dispensing the patronage.43 
Even though Stevens and his APC were successful in converting Sierra Leone 
into a single-party state, the hegemonic push for this feat began with Albert Margai’s 
SLPP in the late 1960s.44  “Although liberal democratic and competitive politics was a 
feature of the first post-independence years, under Milton [Margai] (1961-64) and Later 
Albert Margai (1964-67), the democratic process was limited by Albert Margai’s growing 
authoritarianism and undermined by the failure of the political leadership to respect the 
results of the 1967 election, which Albert Margai lost.”45  Although Albert Margai had 
initiated the push toward consolidating power within his party—and therefore increasing 
his personal power—it was Stevens who completed the deed. 
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Under APC’s hegemonic rule all the institutions that might have served to check 
government agencies were eliminated, and debauched political patronage stepped out into 
the daylight.  Consolidation of the one-party system in 1978 begat widespread abuse and 
scandals because it closed the door on internal accountability.46 The economy, after 
growing 4% per annum in the 1960s, deteriorated sharply over the next two decades as a 
result of rampant corruption.47  “Politicization of the civil service escalated during 
President Stevens’ tenure and is still primarily responsible for its inefficiency…In return 
for their loyalty, civil servants were often shielded, pampered and allowed to increase 
their powers and pursue opportunities for self-enrichment with impunity.”48  Thus, the 
politicization of the civil bureaucracy—which is considered to be generally nonpartisan 
in democratic states—only served to bring it under Stevens’ jurisdiction, thereby 
reducing the autonomy of the civil service by making it more immediately answerable to 
Stevens.  The obvious effect was to undermine the civil service as an institution and 
strengthen Stevens’ grasp. 
Age began to take its toll on Stevens, who announced in July 1985, at age 80, that 
he favored military-commander Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his successor.  
In the October presidential election Momoh reportedly won 99% of the votes cast, 
although there were no candidates running opposite him.49  Siaka Stevens’ seventeen-
year presidency ended upon General Momoh’s inauguration in November 1985.  Stevens 
would fade from political life, and after suffering a stroke in 1987 would die some five 
months later at the age of eighty-three. 
Momoh was a young forty-nine-year-old when he took office.  Initially Momoh’s 
government was received in a spirit of national euphoria, since it was viewed as 
promising a break with the past, an end to corruption, and an opportunity for the nation to 
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live up to its potential.  Momoh was fortunate in that he had the same cross-ethnic 
support base as Stevens did, and lacked any outside obligations to any interest group save 
for the army (which is important in its own right as a tool of force and patrimony).  But at 
the outset, Momoh began to falter by appointing few new faces to his cabinet.  
Immediately his popularity began to disintegrate.  Agitation against the old guard and 
calls for a fresh cabinet compelled Momoh to call general elections a year early, in May 
1986.   
Apparently the transfer of personalized power—that by Stevens to Momoh—is a 
very difficult and fragile thing.  Personalized power depends in large part on personality 
and one’s ability to render favors.  Momoh was only able to hold on for a short while 
before he had to make concessions.  Early events remained relatively peaceful until 
widespread political tumult in 1990, which brought about demands for the country to 
return to a multiparty system.  The resulting national referendum in August 1991 was 
overwhelmingly in favor of altering the constitution to permit political pluralism.  In view 
of that, registration of political parties began again in November 1991, and hegemonic 
rule was somewhat reversed. 
While initially popular, Momoh’s APC government faced mounting odds.  
Although multi-party politics were permissible, these did little to change the entrenched 
patrimonial system and venal networks, which in turn sustained the government’s 
fragility.  Moreover, the decrepit economy Momoh had inherited crumbled further.  The 
economy had shifted in the previous decades from one based on cash crops to one not 
depended by and large on Sierra Leone’s mineral resources, such as iron ore, diamonds, 
rutile, and bauxite.  By this time, however, Sierra Leone’s most important iron ore mine 
had been exhausted and diamond smuggling was more than just rampant.   
By the 1990s Sierra Leone had become the fourth largest gem diamond producer 
in the world, with its stones highly prized on the world market—but only powerful 
individuals benefited and not the national treasury.  Records illustrate that official 




absurdly low 48,000 carats in 1988.50  While some believe the cause is due to 
mismanagement of the mines by the nationalized mining company—the government had 
acquired a 51% share in 1970 and almost exclusive control by 198451—the real reason is 
almost solely due to the corruption and smuggling which took place.  For example, as late 
as 1995 it was estimated that 90% of the diamonds exported from Sierra Leone still left 
the country illegally.52  Consequently, in both 1991 and 1992, Sierra Leone’s abysmal 
economy earned the country the dubious reputation of being declared the poorest country 
in the world, with 65% of its population living below the poverty line.53 
With official exports declining, the revenue from diamond smuggling became an 
obvious necessity for sustaining the venal networks. 
De jure sovereignty usually grants leaders a place in the international forum and 
immunity from serious outside scrutiny of their internal affairs.  Rulers of weak states 
receive recognition of sovereignty from the international realm because of their 
identifiable status as those who can speak for domestic matters of global interest.  It is for 
that reason that a leader’s ability to provide answers when it comes to foreign concerns is 
of more importance to the outside world than are internal policies.54  A weak state may 
not have full political legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents, but so long as other states 
recognize it as sovereign, it gains a certain ipso facto legitimacy.  Sovereignty is indeed 
contextual.55  By matter of circumstance, this in turn provides linkages to external 
resources, such as international aid agencies and foreign government credits, which the 
regime uses to bolster its control within its “sovereign” territory. 
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Though Momoh had demonstrated through his introduction of multiparty politics 
that he was open to reform, this was only superficial.  Actual power continued to reside in 
Momoh and his close associates with which he surrounded himself.  These were a band 
of Limbas largely from Binkolo, Momoh’s home village, who formed an impregnable 
wall around Momoh and formed the apex of the venal networks that had become the 
state.56 
In the meantime, Momoh’s difficulties were compounded by the outbreak of 
violence in neighboring Liberia when, on December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor led a rebel 
force into his homeland in Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire.  What began as a series of border 
skirmishes later developed into an invasion of parts of the country by Liberian rebels.  
While Sierra Leone’s economic condition worsened, its military defended the borders 
against the Liberian rebels and, later on, also internally defended the country against the 
Sierra Leonean rebel movement spawned by it. 
The fiscal demands of supporting a war effort and implementing economic 
reforms in compliance with international agencies’ mandates proved too much.  In late 
1991 Momoh’s government lost the capacity to pay civil servants and the military for a 
period of three to four months.  Moreover, the diamond business had slipped out of the 
hands of those close to Momoh and into the hands of Charles Taylor.  This further 
undermined Momoh’s venal networks, and therefore his grasp on power and, indeed, the 
state itself.   
When Momoh had taken office in 1985 the situation on the surface looked bright 
at first.  He had taken a firm anti-corruption stance but over time was plagued by the 
entrenched patrimonial system.  The miserable economy he had inherited upon his 
accession was exacerbated by his administration’s serious lack of financial discipline.57  
By April 1992, Momoh and his politicians had lost their credibility and legitimacy.  This 
reality was demonstrated when Sierra Leonean troops from the eastern front traveled to 
Freetown purportedly to protest conditions and their lack of pay.  In actuality, twenty-
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seven-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser had led his men to take over the government 
on 29 April, citing corruption, nepotism, and general mismanagement.  Momoh was 
forced to flee to Guinea and Strasser announced the formation of a National Provisional 
Ruling Council (NPRC), whose priorities were to end the border war, restore multiparty 
democracy, and set in motion reform of the economy.58  After Momoh’s government was 
ousted in 1992 by the NPRC, governmental inquiries into corruption exposed Momoh’s 
government as more financially fraudulent than any thus far.59 
F. SHADOW STATE 
Eventually a regime leader reaches the limit of appointments he can dole out, and 
turns to the next obvious power source.  He uses his control as a regime leader to 
manipulate state resources in the international market.  In short, he replaces straight 
political favoritism with economic influence. 
A regime leader is able to accomplish this via the vehicle of de facto sovereignty 
granted to him by the international realm, which in turn grants the political leader access 
to foreign money sources.  These he uses to seize more control within his territory by 
amassing a personal fortune and by granting non-merit access in exchange for political 
allegiance.  “It is widely misunderstood that this money, quietly salted away from kick-
backs on contracts, concessions and export deals, is for personal enrichment.  In fact 
patrimonial accounts are political resources.  The ‘personal fortunes’ of patrimonial 
leaders are political bank accounts used to fund the working of…the ‘shadow state’.”60   
The extra-legal control of state resources by an individual is patrimonialism, but 
can also be considered early warning signs of devolution into a warlord state.  This 
commercializing of a leader’s role, when he is cast as the conduit between the resources 
of a country and the global economy, provides him a form of internal security through the 
creation of a quasi-state offering informal linkages with economic benefits.  Internal 
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security heretofore furnished by the state as an institution is subsequently missing 
because the enervated bureaucracy is no longer able to regulate or enforce state policy. 
With the creation of informal linkages, a regime’s loyalties derived by granting 
non-merit access to resources only weakens the state further and enhances the crisis.  
Alongside conventional bureaucratic state capabilities appear progressively stronger 
informal political networks.61  “To sustain a meaningful semblance of sovereignty—the 
exclusive control over territory and people—rulers needed to cut informal deals with 
individuals who exercised power in their own right.”62  In effect, a “shadow state” is 
created that parallels the bureaucracy.  The patronage system embodied in the shadow 
state, stemming from a ruler’s control over resources, is very real but not formally 
recognized.63  
Again, we see a paradoxical cycle.  State rulers make choices that strengthen the 
leader’s position which, inversely, weaken state agencies. 64  Rulers of weak states are 
forced to make choices to ward off competing strongmen and other potential opponents at 
the cost of state-building.  Joel Migdal identifies this as the “politics of survival.”  “This 
elite fears the consequences of political and economic instability and therefore justifies 
the concentration of power at the political center to ward off possible fatal challenges to 
its authority.”65  When the political survival of state leaders becomes the priority at the 
cost of effective government, they are discounting tomorrow in order to survive today.  
The state and its institutions are increasingly weakened while power is concentrated by 
the ruler. 
It was not until Valentine Strasser’s 1992 NPRC government that Sierra Leone 
tipped heavily toward warlordism.  Initially, the NPRC—supposedly a selfless 
government that had taken control with the proletariat in mind—was determined to 
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eradicate patrimonial politics.  The military government tried to sidestep the patrimonial 
civil bureaucracy and investigate it for corruption.  Yet, the NPRC grossly 
underestimated the structure of the entrenched patronage system, and succumbed to 
focusing its investigations only on low level or exiled officials while manifestly 
overlooking the strongmen.66  In so doing, the NPRC degenerated into a model of 
corruption itself.  For example, Strasser’s people in late 1993 allegedly sold 435 carats of 
diamonds to Sweden.67  “Despite these [image-building anti-corruption] measures, 
[Strasser’s NPRC] rapidly lost popular support as it became evident that he and his ruling 
clique were benefiting from the fruits of office.”68  
Even before the disintegration of the NPRC’s anti-corruption objective came 
increased heavy-handedness.  The NPRC military regime suspended the constitution in 
May 1992, instead ruling by decree of the Supreme Council of State (SCS), a mix of 
military and civilian members appointed by the NPRC.  A failed counter-coup by the 
Anti Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) led to consequent executions and a 
general state of tightened control.69  These factors along with the mounting corruption 
compounded by the government’s economically exhausting situation of having to fight 
the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) growing insurgency began to push the country 
through the portal of warlordization. 
Also, Strasser’s access to resources was being choked off by the RUF’s continued 
push into the diamond fields.  The RUF’s targeting of the government’s revenue source 
proved effective.  Since at least 1980 Sierra Leone’s Gross Domestic Product had 
declined, along with its import earnings.70  By the early mid-1990s, RUF fighters and 
rogue soldiers controlled an estimated $250 million in annual trade in diamonds and, 
moreover, denied the government another $60 million in agricultural export earnings 
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from within the RUF-dominated areas.71  The combined effect was to stifle Strasser’s 
authority and also diminish other strongmen’s resources, thereby reducing any concerted 
effort they could make to fight the RUF while also limiting their capacity to reinforce 
patrimonial networks. 
In a last grasp at regaining control Strasser’s NPRC hurriedly increased 
inductions into the army in an effort to bring about a quicker end to the war.  “Those 
recruited in this hasty exercise were ‘mostly drifters, rural and urban unemployed, a fair 
number of hooligans, drug addicts and thieves’.  They came from the same social group 
as the RUF combatants.”72  The not-surprising consequence was that these soldiers 
descended into banditry, with the civilian populace now being victimized by both sides 
and little being accomplished toward subduing the rebellion.  “Both the soldiers and the 
RUF were much more interested in killing civilians than fighting each other.  To ordinary 
Sierra Leoneans, soldiers and rebels were often indistinguishable, so much so that they 
became known as ‘sobels’.”73 
Sierra Leone might have been knocking at warlordism’s door but it did not step 
through just yet.  It had become fully “a ‘soft’ state—one low on legitimacy and deficient 
in the ability to implement policies on a countrywide basis.”74  Its only redeeming 
character was that there was not one man who could exercise unconstrained power, which 
meant that political maneuvering room still existed.  When Strasser attempted to force the 
NPRC to pass decrees enabling him to stay in power he was deposed in late January 1996 
by his second-in-command, Julius Bio, who then promptly turned around and held valid 
elections. 75  Strasser had failed to adequately garner support among his subordinates and 
Sierra Leone was back on the road to improvement, albeit in a broken down bus, but 
there was at least a chance for the better. 
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Because of popular demand and mounting international pressure, Bio insisted that 
elections should go ahead in order to return the country to civilian rule.  In March 1996 
SLPP’s Ahmad Tejan Kabbah ultimately won with 60% of the votes.  Kabbah’s election 
meant the SLPP was once again in power; the first time since it was militarily forced to 
concede to the APC in 1967. 
However, little seemed likely to change with the 1996 election because political 
legitimacy remained rooted in patrimonialism.  Indeed, some lamented that it was 
difficult to see how any of the thirteen contesting political parties would have any new 
idea or effect “for bringing the shadow state to heel while the clandestine extraction of 
diamonds in the forest remain[ed] such a large factor in the political economy of Sierra 
Leone.”76  It was also noted that by the time of President Kabbah’s 1996 election “many 
state institutions were near collapse with most managerial, professional and technical 
personnel having fled, leaving behind a dysfunctional civil service;…; and expenditure 
controls, budgeting, accounting and auditing were weak or non-existent.”77 
On the other hand, times had changed somewhat.  Although patrimonialism still 
underpinned politics it was nowhere near as open as in Stevens’ time.  The two 
administrations prior to Kabbah’s, those of Momoh and NPRC, had succeeded at least in 
maneuvering their patronage influences somewhat back into the shadows.  All the same, 
those three administrations were directly tapped into the international investment market, 
which served as a substitute for the domestic corruption they were pretentiously fighting 
against.  This was an unsettling degeneration in that it marked the deterioration of some 
patronage networks in favor of warlord-type control of the revenue generated by state 
resources internationally. 
Unlike Stevens but like Momoh, Kabbah could not use state assets 
or manipulate economic policies as the major incentives to attract 
supporters, since corruption, creditor prescriptions, and military offensives 
against rivals had drastically pared down or eliminated those options.  
Instead, as with warlords in Liberia, Kabbah used his privileged ties to 
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foreigners to facilitate favored private business operations or at least to 
deny them to disfavored groups or individuals.78 
Things continued to fall apart.  Shortly after taking office, Kabbah negotiated a 
peace treaty with the rebel insurgents.  The rebels, however, failed to honor the peace 
pact.  Then, in addition to that, army leaders led a violent coup against Kabbah on May 
25, 1997 whereupon they installed Major Johnny Paul Koroma as the head of the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
G. WARLORD STATE 
According to William Reno control of markets is the foundation of political 
authority and economic globalization has led to the warlordization of weak states.79  
Warlords are created in response to global capitalism and internal struggle over control of 
resources.  The global economy permits a weak ruler to respond to political grappling by 
acting in his own self-interest, and thanks to the de facto sovereignty granted by the 
international community to a weak-cum-warlord state.80 
As power is distilled from the state’s institutions into the regime’s hands the state 
ceases “helping people to meet their needs or building up a sense of legitimacy among 
them.”81  It becomes a weak state.  No longer possessing dominion through the very state 
agencies he has emasculated, a regime leader now finds his power based purely upon 
patrimonial networks.  As he reaches the extent of his client distribution capabilities, he is 
forced to find other methods of influence.  He readily does so by controlling the state’s 
resource in the global market.  According to Reno, 
Contemporary rulers who lack capable administrations find 
markets to be useful for controlling and disciplining rivals and their 
supporters.  Intervening in markets enables rulers to accumulate wealth 
directly, which is then converted into political resources they can 
distribute at their discretion.  This strategy directly contradicts liberal 
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principles of private markets, since it is designed to block entrepreneurial 
activity among threatening rivals.82 
To all intents and purposes, such action initiates a downward spiral, which 
increasingly detracts from the legitimacy of the state.  Political leaders succumb to the 
pressure of dealing with short-term security by foregoing long-term development plans.  
Leaders’ relations with foreign firms cause them to focus their politics externally rather 
than for their public’s interest.  Control over distribution of foreign income permits a 
leader to divest himself of his bureaucracy and thrust aside threatening internal actors.  In 
due course, the patrimonial network so carefully cultivated in earlier days is discarded.  
The hegemon’s goals have changed from one of political power accumulation into 
personal wealth appropriation. 
Normally, a leader’s power is regularly checked by the bureaucrats in his service 
who are responsible for implementing and overseeing policy.  Whether a weak state ruler 
is able to fully pursue a warlord strategy depends upon how weakened his bureaucracy is.  
The essence of bureaucracy is to take the “individual” out of the equation, to make him 
fungible by means of having standard operating procedures and written rules.  
Technically specialized personnel are one result and, more importantly, efficient 
government is the other.  This works so long as the bureaucracy remains apolitical.  Once 
a leader turns the civil service into a political organism, bureaucrats’ advancement 
becomes based on who they know rather than their job performance.83 
Sweepingly radical changes in policy are difficult to effect within a strong 
bureaucracy because of pedantic adherence to established regulations and norms, and for 
that reason serve to curtail drastic alterations to bureaucratic conventions.  The more a 
state leader weakens his bureaucracy, the more he condenses the decision-making and 
policy enforcement into his own hands.  It becomes, therefore, much easier to implement 
arbitrary and indiscriminate changes.  “[W]arlord politics…jettisons almost entirely many 
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internal components of conventional states, such as bureaucratic hierarchies, or any 
autonomous definition of an interest of state that has characterized even very weak 
states.”84   
Where weak states base their control on bureaucratic institutions, warlords base 
power on their control of resources.  The degree to which a ruler follows a warlord 
strategy depends on the prior extent of “privatization of ruler alliances with external and 
domestic partners in efforts to control internal rivals.”85  In other words, transformation to 
a warlord situation is “a turn away from conventional state structures.”86  The 
accommodation of elites continues at the expense of weakening state institutions, but 
these patrimonial networks are in time replaced by a warlord’s focus on pecuniary rather 
than political gain.  Where the state as an institution is sufficiently strong enough to 
counter the draining of state power away from the bureaucracy, it might successfully 
prevent the state from fully degenerating into a warlord situation.  Once the bureaucracy 
has lost complete economic and political control, the state has collapsed.87  The situation 
then becomes extremely desperate. 
There were many times when Sierra Leone almost lapsed into absolute 
warlordism, but the attendant hegemonic regimes’ partial adherence to the rule of law 
staved off complete degeneration.  It is acknowledged that violence was employed as a 
political tool by the various regimes.  Only one regime, however, wantonly used violence 
against any and all.  Sierra Leone came closest to being a warlord state under the NPRC 
in 1991-96 in view of the fact that the NPRC summarily discarded the constitution and 
ruled by decree.  “Strasser backed his authority with strategies that did not depend on 
effective bureaucracies or state spending, such as executing prisoners…and investigating 
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corruption among civil servants.”88  Yet, it was not until the abhorrent acts inflicted upon 
the civilian populace under the AFRC regime of 1997-98 that Sierra Leone wholly 
slipped from a shadow state into warlordism.  Save for the international military effort 
that restored the weak but legitimate government, warlords would likely still be fighting 
over and plundering Sierra Leone. 
Since 1990 the border skirmishes with the Liberian rebels had festered, inspiring 
dissidents within Sierra Leone until the state of affairs had grown into a full-blown 
guerrilla war.  The Government of Sierra Leone’s (GoSL) forces were pitted against 
rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), formed in 1991 by Foday Sankoh in an 
alliance with Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front for Liberia.  (Sankoh was a former 
corporal in the Sierra Leone army and had been previously incarcerated for his 
complicity in an earlier coup attempt.)  Within a matter of days of assuming office in 
1996, President Kabbah signed a communiqué at Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire with RUF 
leader Corporal Sankoh, in which they effectively agreed to a permanent ceasefire.  That 
agreement opened the way for substantive negotiations between the Government and the 
RUF, culminating in the Abidjan Peace Accord of 30 November 1996. 
Unfortunately, Kabbah mistakenly overlooked the army as a significant player in 
the patrimonial system.  The troops were incensed at the government’s decision to cut 
military spending, which only exacerbated the perception existing in the army at the time 
that the government had greater trust in the militia (the Civil Defense Force, i.e. CDF) 
than its own army.  (The majority of personnel in the CDF were Kamajors from SLPP’s 
southern strongholds.)  Feeling marginalized, the army deposed democratically elected 
President Kabbah on May 25, 1997 in Sierra Leone's third military coup in five years.  
“This latest coup demonstrated the true nature of the Sierra Leone Army….  The 
army…now revealed itself to most Sierra Leoneans as a brutal and corrupt institution 
riddled with criminals…”89 
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The coup conspirators sprung Major Johnny Paul Koroma from prison (where he 
had been since plotting a coup in 1995) and asked him to lead the new military 
government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).  Koroma began a reign 
of terror, destroying the economy and murdering enemies.  Probably as a means of 
pacification and to retain power, the AFRC invited RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his 
rebels to join forces with it.  In a “coalition of momentary convenience”90 not having to 
concentrate on fighting a war allowed the former foes to collectively pursue plunder. 
As a warlord state under Koroma’s AFRC, Sierra Leone was unsurpassed.  
Koroma turned the country into his personal domain.  In forming a coalition with Foday 
Sankoh and his RUF rebels, Koroma had co-opted his greatest political challenger and, as 
a consequence, fortified his supremacy.  Indeed there had been previous despots who had 
almost succeeded in achieving personalized unilateral control over the entire country.  
However, of the first three coups—which altogether lasted from March 21, 1967 until 
April 17, 1968—only the National Reformation Council endured for more than a few 
days.  Even then, infighting among its leadership never let a true ruler prevail over his 
contemporaries and therefore saved Sierra Leone from becoming an earlier warlord state.  
Because none of these earlier hegemons was able to completely build up and sustain 
sufficient personal power, none was able to enlarge his dominance into that of a 
warlord’s. 
The various civilian administrations also approached warlordism but never fully 
stepped over the threshold.  The presidents certainly used patronage networks to retain 
their political positions, switching from plundering state resources outright to eventually 
controlling foreign income into Sierra Leone.  What kept them, however, from fully 
turning Sierra Leone into a warlord state was the lesser degree of violence employed and 
the extent to which they followed the constitution.  Without question, all made use of a 
variety of measures of extra-legal suppression to silence their opposition, even quasi-
judicially executing some opponents.  None, though, were as statutorily flagrant or 
                                                 




committed the boldfaced murders and atrocities on the scale of the AFRC.91  In addition 
to suspending the constitution and banning political activity in general the AFRC “killed, 
tortured, or arbitrarily detained anyone they perceived threatening their hold on power.”92 
In addition, previous political leaders’ dismissal of the army as nothing more than 
a political toy caused it to decay such that it was incapable of responding to foreign 
aggression or maintaining internal peace.  This left the back door wide open for Sankoh 
and his rebels.  Adroit soldiers remained in Freetown where they could maintain their 
own resource linkages while the underpaid, under-trained and often under-aged soldiers 
were sent out to confront an elusive enemy with whom they actually had a great deal in 
common. 
H. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, Sierra Leone’s problems started before its independence.  
Patrimonialism and the use of force characterized the system of governance taught by its 
colonizer to Sierra Leone’s people.  Compounding this was the fact that Sierra Leoneans 
had little experience at autonomous government by the time of Sierra Leone’s 
independence.  These aspects induced an exclusionary political system whereby those in 
control became uncompromising because they believed any concessions were potentially 
a divestment of their power to their competitors. 
Furthermore, in order to maintain and strengthen the regime’s control, patrimonial 
appointments were bestowed as political favors.  The effect was that the regime’s leaders, 
instead of being replaceable implementers of the state, grew to become an inseparable 
part of the state.  In other words, they became the state itself, whereby individuals 
superseded the state as an institution.   
The political intransigence increased as those in control consolidated their power 
by making politics more exclusionary.  The regime employed extra-judicial force while 
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endeavoring to officially convert Sierra Leone into a single-party state.  When this finally 
occurred, it significantly strengthened Stevens’ individual power as the regime leader, 
thus allowing him to have greater personal autonomy in Sierra Leone’s governance.  
Another outcome of the single-party state was the additional weakening of the 
bureaucracy.  Patrimonial appointments within the civil service converted the formerly 
apolitical bureaucracy into an organization obligated to the regime’s demands, in place of 
institutionalized rules and regulations. 
The net result of the exclusionary politics, the patrimonial networks, and the 
politicized bureaucracy was to weaken the state as an institution and to engender a 
parallel shadow-state formed by the conversion of the formal system of governance into 
one constructed of informal networks derived from patrimonial influences.  In other 
words, devotion to duty was made subservient to allegiance to political leaders.  This 
enhanced the personal control of the regime leader and allowed him to further turn away 
from conventional state structures—clearly a downward spiral for the state. 
In addition, corruption typified all of Sierra Leone’s administrations.  Although 
each successive regime promised to eradicate corruption, it was instead beguiled by it.  
The entrenched patrimonial system was too strong to overcome and the lure of personal 
enrichment enticed each leader to use the state’s resources for the personal accumulation 
of wealth, which was correspondingly used to satisfy the patronage networks. 
Political rivalry lingered, however, which eventually caused Sierra Leone to 
return to a multi-party system.  By that time, though, Sierra Leone’s deep-rooted 
corruption, the disastrously disheveled economy, and the incipient rebel war proved 
insurmountable.  The combination of these dynamics collapsed the state and opened the 
door for increasingly warlord-like regimes, ultimately resulting in the outright plunder of 
state resources strictly for personal gain and a complete disregard for any formalized 
system of governance.  In short, Sierra Leone became a warlord state.  When the 
circumstances have reached that stage the problem became far more entrenched and 
difficult to rectify, because warlords have an intrinsic interest in maintaining the status 




Using these historical details to delineate the warlordization process illuminates 
the depth of the hole out of which a failed state must climb and that the restructuring 
course of action is not a simple reversal of the steps leading into warlordism.  By 
examining the progression it becomes clear that the essential resolution is to bypass many 
of these causes that lead to warlordism in order to implement a government sufficiently 
strong enough to stand on its own as a formalized institution immune to the pressures that 






























III. EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SIERRA LEONE 
This chapter will analyze the responses of various external intervenors in Sierra 
Leone in accordance with Kumar’s four-step model.  Consequently, this chapter will 
assess the strategies of each intervenor, in terms of the warlord model from Chapter 2, 
and the peacebuilding goals.  
A. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES 
The mercenary firm Executive Outcomes operated in Sierra Leone from May 
1995 until February 1997.  Strasser recognized his own insecurity and the ineffectiveness 
of his army, and therefore hired a private security firm, Executive Outcomes, to train his 
soldiers and safeguard the diamond areas.  In May 1995 thirty Executive Outcomes 
personnel arrived and quickly trained 150 soldiers.  Army leadership feared a 
professionally trained cadre and therefore rebuffed sending more than the first group of 
150 trainees for military instruction.  Accordingly, EO began to train the local militia:  
the Kamajor of the Civil Defense Force.93  By the time Executive Outcomes departed in 
February 1997, the Kamajor had grown to 10,000 strong and quickly proved themselves 
an effective fighting force.94  This was significant given that the RUF’s strength was only 
a few thousand fighters, and that the army had some 14,000 “soldiers”—two-thirds of 
whom had been hastily recruited.95 
The RUF now had to face the fact that its enemy was no longer the army but the 
Kamajor.  Under the leadership of Executive Outcomes, combined army-Kamajor 
operations proved highly effective in 1996.  Several thousand RUF were killed or forced 
to flee, and in November 1996 a comprehensive peace accord was signed between the 
RUF and the government of Sierra Leone.96 
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There are several incidents which suggest Executive Outcomes had a strategy for 
Sierra Leone’s national development.  For example, Executive Outcomes’ presence 
brought security and facilitated a cease-fire.  It is even argued that Executive Outcomes’ 
presence brought about Sierra Leone’s 1996 elections.  Taken together, it might appear as 
though Executive Outcomes had a state-building strategy.  However, beyond the security 
objective and Executive Outcomes’ possible insistence on elections, there was little 
strategy involved outside its profit motive as a private security firm, as evidenced by its 
threat to leave in 1995 due to nonpayment.97   
Although Executive Outcomes demonstrated military efficiency and political 
loyalty to its client, it had no real political responsibility.  Money was its goal, not the 
cessation of conflict.  At best, its intervention can be considered a limited peace 
enforcement mission.  It was limited in time and strategy—enduring as long as there was 
income for the company.  For that reason, the result of Executive Outcomes’ actions was 
only to prop up the weak government.  It should come as no surprise that the security 
situation immediately deteriorated upon Executive Outcomes’ departure, and Sierra 
Leone found itself in the same situation as before, if not worse. 
Concerning the peacebuilding goals in a warlord situation, at best Executive 
Outcomes functioned to temporarily debase the warlords by countering the rebels’ 
military might and retaking some of the diamond areas. 
B. ECOMOG 
When Executive Outcomes personnel left Sierra Leone in February 1997, it 
quickly became clear that the interval of peace in Sierra Leone was directly related to 
Executive Outcomes’ presence.  The private military firm’s departure left the way clear 
for rebellious soldiers to violently overthrow the government in April 1997, destroying 
what little security existed in Sierra Leone.  The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’s 
(AFRC) military government criminalized itself further by partnering with the RUF in a 
combined pursuit of plunder. 
                                                 





President Kabbah, forced to flee to Guinea, appealed to the international 
community for help.  Fortuitously, troops from the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in their mission to protect Monrovia, 
Liberia’s capital, from the encroachment of Charles Taylor’s forces were already rear-
based in Sierra Leone.  Nigerians composed the largest part of the ECOMOG forces—
about 70% in Liberia and 90% in Sierra Leone.98 
In Liberia, diamond-digging ECOMOG troops and their insurgent-collaborating, 
profiteering commanders tarnished ECOMOG’s reputation.99  Describing ECOMOG’s 
activities in Liberia, Stephen Ellis writes, “The ECOMOG intervention… created new 
economic opportunities which ECOMOG itself exploited, making the peace-keeping 
force a party to the war itself.”100  Given the Nigerians’ conduct in Liberia, Kabbah’s 
petition to them for help was a little like asking the fox to guard the henhouse. 
However, the Nigerians did respond to Kabbah’s request for assistance and, in the 
end, though they may not have looted Freetown, they reacted only marginally better than 
the rebels themselves with regard to civilians caught in the conflict.  In June 1997, with 
intentions of dislodging the RUF, they recklessly shelled Freetown from the sea causing 
numerous civilian casualties.  The Nigerians then hunkered around the Lungi 
International Airport across the bay from Freetown until February 1998, at which time 
they made a successful but bloody push to evict the AFRC and its RUF allies from 
Freetown.  In October 1998, the RUF and its AFRC colleagues were ready to return and 
began intensifying its attacks against ECOMOG's 15,000 soldiers.  In December 1998, 
the rebels launched an all-out offensive on Freetown, occupying most of the capital for a 
brief period in January 1999 before being driven back into the jungle.  Some six thousand 
people were killed that January in Freetown alone.101   
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Equally hazardous to the civilian non-combatants during this period were the 
Nigerians.  Sierra Leone’s Information Minister, Julius Spencer, warned that because 
Nigerian troops were having difficulty engaging the rebels who were mixing with 
civilians in the streets, anyone found in the streets would be considered a rebel and would 
be shot on sight.  To compound the situation, when the rebels captured the eastern and 
central parts of Freetown, they forced residents to come out and demonstrate for peace, 
threatening to burn down their houses if they did not participate in these compulsory 
rallies.  When the citizens yielded to rebel coercion, Nigerian jet bombers were 
dispatched to drop bombs on them.102  After weeks of bloody fighting, the Nigerians 
retook the capital and once more forced the rebels out of Freetown. 
In this light it is easy to see how ECOMOG troops were not in Sierra Leone on a 
peace mission but rather as the country’s substitute army.  ECOMOG acted in Sierra 
Leone on behalf of the president to restore his elected government to power.  The only 
problem was that eventually ECOMOG would re-deploy back to its own country, leaving 
Sierra Leone under pretty much the same pre-conflict circumstances; the weak state 
would not have been changed. 
ECOMOG’s actions were very similar to Executive Outcomes’.  Theirs was 
nothing more than another limited peace enforcement mission which would serve only to 
sustain a weak government without improving matters.  If anything, ECOMOG’s 
performance can be considered worse than Executive Outcomes’.  Contrary to Executive 
Outcomes, ECOMOG did not enjoy popular support and targeted civilians.  Moreover, 
ECOMOG accomplished little toward debasing the warlords.  It never took real control of 
diamond areas away from the rebels. 
C. THE UNITED NATIONS 
In June 1998 the United Nations decided to become directly involved beyond the 
sanctions and diplomatic language to which it had previously resorted, by establishing the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone.  UNOMSIL’s purpose was to monitor 
and advise on efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the country’s military, and 
                                                 




document reports of atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians.103  
The operation failed because in January 1999 UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated due 
to the fighting in Freetown. 
In another stab at peace, the parties to the 1999 Lomé peace accord, signed July 7, 
requested the UN’s returned presence and an expanded role for UNOMSIL.  The UN 
obliged in October 1999 by establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), which was a newer and much larger operation.  In November 1999 the first 
troops arrived as part of an authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 
military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of 
the Lomé peace agreement.  At the same time, the Council decided to terminate 
UNOMSIL. 
Violence again erupted in May 2000, when rebels seized some 500 United 
Nations peacekeeping troops, mostly Zambians.104  At least four Kenyan UN 
peacekeepers were killed105, and inside Freetown RUF members gunned down nineteen 
people demonstrating outside Sankoh’s house against RUF’s violation of the peace 
accords.106  It was not until July that the last couple hundred of these hostages were 
released.  Fighting between pro-government forces and the RUF resumed, re-igniting the 
civil war that had supposedly ended in July 1999 with the conclusion of the peace accord 
in Lomé, Togo.  The RUF appeared ready to forcefully re-enter Freetown in mid-2000 
until the British deployed combat troops.   
UNAMSIL faced many difficulties.  The force was initially bolstered by Nigerian 
troops, who were there as a follow-up to ECOMOG.  Changed politics back home and 
the rising cost of the war abroad eventually triggered Nigeria’s intended withdrawal from 
Sierra Leone by May 2000.  Their pending withdrawal underscored the weakness of the 
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UNAMSIL force, which was poorly resourced and composed mostly of mixed troops 
from lesser militaries.  
Other problems further compounded the UN’s task.  In September 2000, while 
citing its decision as a “routine matter,” India decided to withdraw its 3,000-member 
faction.  Unfortunately the Indian soldiers were among the best equipped and trained in 
UNAMSIL, and their withdrawal came at a time when the UN was trying to secure more 
troops to augment UNAMSIL’s authorized increase.  Moreover, a memo by the Indian 
contingent surfaced asserting charges of corruption against important members of the 
Nigerian faction.107 
Despite seemingly insurmountable difficulties the Secretary General has 
continued to garner support for the mission and the operation in Sierra Leone has 
persevered.  Today, the UN mission stands as the largest peace operation ever 
undertaken, having grown from its initial deployment of 6,000 peace troops to a currently 
authorized strength (March 2002 resolution) of 17,500 military personnel, including 260 
military observers and 90 civilian police personnel. 
In addition, the UN’s task has grown beyond just the military aspect of 
successfully negotiating an end to the conflict.  The UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates humanitarian aid, while Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) officers ensure mutual understanding between civil and military 
authorities of their respective responsibilities.  It has also established a Humanitarian 
Information Center (HIC), the purpose being to promote 
a more inclusive and effective approach to the collection, sharing 
and use of information supporting both the individual activities of UN 
agencies, NGOs, donors and the government as well as a more cohesive 
response by all these actors combined.  At its simplest, an HIC offers a 
neutral space for the sharing of information and provides the service of 
disseminating contact information and daily reports.  Alternatively, in a 
complex emergency with many diverse actors, an HIC can play a vital role 
in focusing the combined energies towards common goals.108 
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Coordinating civilian inputs has rounded out the UN’s approach to coherently 
addressing resolution of the conflict. 
Retrospective analysis of the UN’s entrance into Sierra Leone indicates how and 
why its first mission was destined to fail.  UNOMSIL came in as a peacekeeping force to 
stand between what it mistakenly believed to be consenting parties.109  UNOMSIL was 
purely a peacekeeping operation in that its purpose was to monitor the implementation of 
peace accords between the combatants.  That was very shortsighted given the heinous 
nature of the conflict and the façade of consent—keeping in mind previous peace 
agreements and subsequent reneging.  Tellingly, despite the fact that Sankoh had signed 
the peace accords, he had no representative present when the first UN troops arrived in 
Sierra Leone in November 1999.110  The UN’s myopic perception of circumstances was 
embarrassingly evident when the mission was forced to evacuate in January 1999. 
The UNAMSIL mission which replaced UNOMSIL’s was a step in the right 
direction, deploying from the outset as a peace-enforcement operation, albeit a 
Pollyannish one.  UNAMSIL troops were posted throughout the country to cooperate 
with the Government of Sierra Leone and assist it in disarming the combatants.  Even 
then, the mission was reticent to fully execute its role as a peace enforcer.  This was 
exemplified when rebels in the eastern part of the country took hostage several hundred 
UN troops. 
Despite the weakness of both UN missions, they have been by far the best 
prospect to date for Sierra Leone’s survival, and this is especially true of UNAMSIL.  
From the outset this mission acted as the Government of Sierra Leone’s guarantor, and 
sought to establish a stable and viable political process—a necessary precondition to 
induce a sense of nationalism among the populace.  Additionally, the Secretary General 
recognized the need for longevity, and continually petitioned for the mission’s 
reauthorization. 
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4de094?OpenDocument> ]24 May 2002]. 
109 “United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, Available [Online] < http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm > [15 
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Moreover, the UN’s initial efforts were again shortsighted.  The UN did target the 
warlords’ power base, but UNAMSIL fixated on disarmament without addressing how 
the arms were supplied.  Once the UN imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone’s diamond 
industry in July 2000, things quickly took a turn for the better.  The UN had erred by 
incompletely performing the first step of the peacebuilding model—thoroughly assessing 
the situation.  Without debasing warlords, the end result would still have been a weak 
state, just not as weak as under the previous two intervenors.  Fortunately, Britain had 
enough awareness to recognize the UN’s shortcomings. 
D. BRITAIN 
Triggered by the RUF detention of UN forces, but ostensibly to protect its own, 
Great Britain rapidly deployed about 1,000 paratroops to evacuate its citizens from Sierra 
Leone in May 2000.  While there, the paratroops’ mission was enhanced to include 
securing part of Freetown and assisting UNAMSIL.111  By June 2000, the British 
presence had been drawn down to only about 200 troops, who remained there as military 
trainers and to provide unobligated assistance to UNAMSIL.  On August 25, 2000 the 
“West Side Boys,” a group of former soldiers turned bandits, took eleven British soldiers 
hostage.  A dramatic British rescue operation on 10 September not only released the 
prisoners but put an end to the West Side Boys.  This demonstrated Britain’s willingness 
to use force and its resolve to stay in Sierra Leone as a backup force to both UNAMSIL 
and the new Sierra Leone Army, which Britain now began to recruit, train, and equip in 
earnest. 
When India pulled its 3,000-strong contingent out of the UN force in Sierra Leone 
in September 2000, Britain came under pressure to take a lead in strengthening the UN 
operation.  Although the British government had been debating about sending British 
military units to take part as a specific contingent of the UNAMSIL mission, it instead 
chose to maintain its separate training force.  Britain also partially yielded, however, and 
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consequently decided to send a few senior officers to participate in UNAMSIL as 
military observers and to serve in senior staff positions. 
Britain’s strategy was comprised of three key elements:  to assist the government 
of Sierra Leone, to restore the peace, and to rebuild Sierra Leone.112  To carry out the 
mission its cadre of troops re-trained the Sierra Leonean army from the ground up.  
Without a doubt, British intervention helped improve the police and army, and reduced 
the institutionalized-bullying of misguided soldiers. 
A second Abuja Agreement, signed May 2001, set the stage for a significant 
reduction in hostilities.  As disarmament of the rebels progressed, the British cadre led 
the Sierra Leone army into formerly rebel-held areas with the intention of reasserting 
government authority there.  A September 2001 meeting between President Kabbah and 
RUF’s General Sesay culminated in inchoate peace, with about 16,000 fighters from 
various groups, out of a total of 45,000, disarmed at that time.113 
A significant reason for the success experienced by Britain is that it came into 
Sierra Leone with a realistic grasp of the situation and a willingness to use force.  Unlike 
the diplomatic flailings exhibited by the UN when its soldiers were taken hostage in May 
2000, Britain’s reaction to British soldiers being taken hostage in August 2000 was swift, 
violent, and deadly for the instigators.  Furthermore, Britain correctly assessed the army 
as another warlord tool and remedied UNAMSIL’s oversight of it.  Rectifying this 
potential trouble spot notably strengthened the Government of Sierra Leone by furnishing 
it a means of self-protection.  Britain arrived in Sierra Leone as a hard-line peace 
enforcement mission that advanced a peacebuilding objective complementary to 
UNAMSIL’s efforts.  Both these efforts together, though still ongoing, will likely 
recondition the government enough to stand on its own. 
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In considering Kumar’s four-step model, the faults and merits of each intervention 
become clear.  The early interventions completed little, if any, assessment of the situation 
before becoming involved.  Moreover, they did not have any real strategy beyond the 
application of combat power. 
Executive Outcomes as a private security firm received its mission from its 
employer, the government of Sierra Leone.  However, the leaders in government lacked 
the insight and perhaps the will to effect changes, beyond just holding off the rebels, to 
include those necessary within the government to permit a more peaceful avenue of 
advance for the rebels.  In brief, although Executive Outcomes stepped in without 
assessing the situation and therefore had no real strategy, it was almost inadvertently a 
successful mission, but the success would have only been temporary until its departure.   
Executive Outcome’s best accomplishment was retaking possession of some of 
the diamond fields.  Cutting off the rebels’ source of earnings would have eventually 
stifled their momentum.  The irony of the situation, however, is that Executive Outcomes 
recaptured the diamond areas not because of a well-planned strategy, but simply because 
that was the only way the security firm was going to be paid. 
If the government of Sierra Leone had been able to keep Executive Outcomes in 
its employ, then quite possibly, had Executive Outcomes regained control of all diamond 
areas, the war might have ended sooner.  Even so, this would have only been a temporary 
setback to the rebels, since the government as an institution would not have been 
changed.  Had Executive Outcomes pursued the war until it dried up the rebels’ 
resources, then the rebels—though temporarily made combat ineffective—only had to 
wait until Executive Outcomes’ departure before resuming their fight.  Had Executive 
Outcomes reassessed the situation as in Kumar’s fourth step, it likely would have come to 
the correct conclusion that depriving the rebels of the diamond fields was the key to 
initial success.  Still, this success would have been short lived without fundamental 
changes in governance—something well beyond Executive Outcomes’ scope. 
The measuring of ECOMOG’s actions amounts to something worse.  Whereas 




close.  ECOMOG intervenors were already in Sierra Leone for their intervention mission 
in Liberia and therefore did not assess the circumstances in Sierra Leone before taking 
action.  They simply faced in a new direction and started fighting another enemy.  
Accordingly, they had no real strategy above the tactical level.  This is evidenced by their 
uncomplicated, straightforward application of combat power against rebels’ combat 
power.  ECOMOG was content to slug it out with the rebels, believing themselves to be 
successful so long as the capital did not fall.  However, ECOMOG failed to consider the 
rebels’ willingness to sustain combat so long as they continued to be able to gain profits 
from the diamond areas. 
In comparing the UN’s and Great Britain’s actions, one can see that, separately, 
neither was the correct path to success.  By good fortune they were in reality 
complementary and mutually reinforcing.  The UN was the first willing to step into the 
sticky situation, but then Great Britain had the prescience to recognize the UN’s shortfalls 
and instead of duplicating efforts simply took on a balancing role. 
 Both meticulously calculated their involvement, with the correctness of their 
calculations evidenced by the successes and failures of their individual strategies.  For 
instance, the UN’s first attempt at peace in Sierra Leone was chased out because it lacked 
sufficient combat power, a fault owing to an inaccurate assessment of the situation.  Its 
assessment obviously improved, however, when it returned with a stronger force.  Yet, it 
remained shortsighted as exemplified by its reticence to use the force it had.  Fortunately, 
Great Britain stepped in to fill this gap. 
All told, the UN’s strategy was far better than that of Executive Outcomes or 
ECOMOG’s, being that it not only had a strategy in the first place, but also one that 
integrated goals more far reaching than the simple defeat of the government’s enemy.  
Nonetheless, the UN had overlooked one key detail in its plan—Sierra Leone’s army—a 
mission that Britain importantly adopted in tandem to UNAMSIL’s actions.  
Professionalizing the army, i.e. converting it into a reliable organization wholly 
accountable to the elected government, creates the stability needed for UNAMSIL’s 
governance issues to take hold, to rebuild the infrastructure, and to reincorporate the 




Also, both the UN and the United Kingdom are assisting the fledgling Sierra 
Leonean government gain control of its diamond industry.  It is a country very rich in 
natural resources and, just as these have worked to its disadvantage in the past, if 
properly supervised they can be the driving force to build the country back up again.  Not 
until UN Security Council Resolution 1306 in July 2000 did the UN finally accept this 
fact by imposing sanctions on the illicit diamond trade originating in Sierra Leone, thus 
trying to dry up warlords’ profits.  In addition to the sanctions the UK has been 
extraordinarily instrumental in training and pushing the Sierra Leone army back out to 
the reaches of its territory.  Trailing behind the soldier’s advance are police and officials 
from other government ministries.  The UN is assisting these civil administrators to bring 
the diamond trade under government control, yet the consolidation of these initiatives 
will take a good deal of time. 
Enabling the government to realistically and successfully take charge of the 
diamond trade will be an enormous task.  The illicit diamond industry is comparable to 
drug smuggling in the United States.  To Sierra Leone’s advantage, though, it is not 
trying to eradicate an industry so much as redirect the business away from Liberia and 
through the government of Sierra Leone.  A substantial impediment is diamonds’ 
diminutive size and ease of transportability.  This is compounded by the virtual 
impossibility of identifying a diamond’s origin, which the closed society of the diamond 
industry indifferently uses to its advantage to make diamonds an extremely fungible 
currency.  The complementary efforts of the UK and UN to reassert government control 
in the diamond areas, followed by assisting government oversight of the industry, will go 
far toward recouping their significance for Sierra Leone’s benefit and undermining the 
potential for re-warlordization. 
Restoration of Sierra Leone as a country appears to be a probable success.  It still 
faces, however, two equally hazardous dangers.  Although the UN Secretary General may 
comprehend the necessary duration of his mission in Sierra Leone, convincing the 
Security Council to support it for any length of time is a large obstacle.  Generally, the 
Security Council’s consent is given for only short periods—the current authorization only 




continuously receive short-term authorization for its operation implies it could be 
abruptly withdrawn midstream in the peacebuilding process. 
UNAMSIL’s early withdrawal would open the way for the second danger.  Too 
many political figures from Sierra Leone’s appalling past are prominent on today’s stage.  
The international community must monitor these individuals to prevent them from 
metamorphosing into warlords.  Foday Sankoh may be in jail and in poor health but one 
his lieutenants, Sam “Mosquito” Bockerie, has taken his place.  Bockerie continues to 
operate as a minor warlord in the bush between Sierra Leone and Liberia, and could 
quickly grow into another menace with the approval of Charles Taylor.  Equally profound 
is the fact that Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the killer, ultra-corrupt AFRC regime is 
again a figure in politics, having unsuccessfully run for the presidency but nevertheless 
having received a disproportionately large quantity of soldiers’ votes—therefore perhaps 
sparking tempting ideas about another army takeover.  John Karefa Smart, an 
octogenarian with all the political baggage from the Margai days, also unsuccessfully ran 
for the presidency.  In addition, Deputy Minister of Defence Sam Hinga-Norman, who 
still exerts an enormous amount of patrimonial influence and has been appointed the 
Deputy Defence Minister in the new government, is another potential threat to Sierra 
Leone’s fragile stability.  The dismantling of the Civil Defence Force, over which he is in 
charge, has been continuously postponed. 
In conclusion, the intervention actions that are taking place are on the right track.  
Great Britain enforced the peace while UNAMSIL worked through the peacemaking 
portion.  Together, their efforts have gradually evolved into peacebuilding, and whether 
peace will hold and good governance will prevail will be evident in the coming years.  
What remains to be seen is if the international community’s steadfastness will last and if 

























A. STEPS TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION 
The case of Sierra Leone well shows that failure to follow Kumar’s four-step 
model can make it very difficult for an intervention to succeed.  In the first place, as we 
have seen, failure to correctly assess the situation sets up consequential problems in the 
determined strategy.  Secondly, careful evaluation of the circumstances will lead to a 
much better strategy and will help intervenors avoid likely future mistakes.  Also, it is 
necessary that the developed strategy be sufficiently carried through to an end state such 
that the intervention’s efforts to recondition a government become self-sustaining.  Too-
short efforts only serve to protract the conflict by propping up a weak government, thus 
renewing its power just enough to continue but not win the struggle.  In consideration of 
Kumar’s third step, the peace mission must integrate all intervenors’ efforts.  This step is 
well exemplified by the harmonizing outcomes of UNAMSIL’s and Great Britain’s feats.  
The last aim is a continual process of incorporating feedback into the peace mission for 
the duration of the campaign.  A clear example was the stronger resolution issued by the 
UN to its second mission in light of the first’s flimsiness. 
Along with those steps, it is necessary to take into consideration the warlord 
model.  This is used to understand the devolution into warlordism such that an 
incomplete peace plan can be prevented.  The warlord model that was developed 
demonstrated that the problems are deep-rooted and become progressively worse.  By the 
time the situation becomes manifested in warlordism, circumstances are dire, indeed, and 
the solution, therefore, requires a sense of longevity—intervenors have to see the process 
through beyond the redesign of the state toward the creation of a stable and viable 
political process.  To facilitate this, intervenors will have to identify and remove a 




A viable state would have the following characteristics, as identified by Ali 
Mazrui:114 
1. Sovereign control over territory115 
2. Sovereign oversight and supervision…of the nation’s resources 
3. Effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods, and services 
4. Capacity to build and maintain an adequate national infrastructure 
5. Capacity to render social services such as sanitation, education, housing, 
fire brigades, hospitals and clinics, and immunization facilities 
6. Capacity for governance and maintenance of law and order 
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Peacemaking, ed. David Smock and Chester Crocker (Washington, D.C.:  United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1995), 11. 
115  Jeffrey Herbst offers an interesting addendum relating to Mazrui’s first function.  He notes that 
there is a relationship between the geographical size of a country, how weak a state is, and the likelihood of 
success.  
Due to the problems posed by low population density, small countries are more 
likely to retain control over their populations for longer periods of time than 
geographically large countries where the capital is far away from large segments of the 
population….  It is particularly notable that in wars in small states, the capital itself 
becomes the battleground…because it was so easy for combatants to get to the center of 
power.  In contrast, wars in larger states have the potential to end with a territorial 
division…or simply to drag on because the capital cannot reach the rebels in the 
countryside and the rebels cannot march on the central state….115 
In brief, large countries fail in a different manner than small ones.  Because smaller countries have 
less territory to control they would be better candidates for intervention and overall success.  Herbst’s 
theory should not be used as an excuse to write off large countries as likely to fail and thus unwinnable—
which would certainly be the case if they were treated with neglect.  Instead of using his theory as a reason 
to ignore large countries, it is better employed as a reminder that larger countries sometimes require special 
attention with regard to legitimate control over their sovereign territory. 
Carrying on with respect to difficulties associated with dealing with a larger territory, the 
difficulties related to geographic size do not stop with intervenors helping a government to assert control 
over its large territory, i.e. having control of the borders.  Any intervention must seek to include the 
provincial people, to gain control of not just the borders but also the hinterlands.  Typically, the last refuge 
of a weak state is its own capital, where it would completely close its eyes to the rest of the country in 
desperation to save itself.  Of course, this is self-detrimental in the end, inducing or reinforcing in rural 
areas a turning away from the nationalism necessary for the polity to evolve as a nation.  Incorporating 
backlanders into effective public institutions along with meaningful political inclusion is, therefore, more 
difficult in a larger territory, but a necessary step in any intervention. 
Jeffrey Herbst, “African Peacekeepers and State Failure,” in Peacekeeping and Peace 





All of Mazrui’s six functions should be the measure by which an intervention’s 
success is gauged; interventions have too often concentrated on the sixth function while 
ignoring the others.  Once an intervention occurs, the government in place or to be 
emplaced must be built up so that it has the capacity to realistically carry out all those 
functions, taking into account its resources and the task at hand. 
In addition to the aforementioned stipulations, there are several general 
conclusions from the Sierra Leone case that can be advantageous to interventions in other 
warlord situations.  Recognition that the conflict itself facilitates a warlord’s access to the 
state’s resources will therefore cause intervenors to see that a warlord will consider any 
attempt at conflict resolution unwelcome.  Hence, intervenors’ troops must have the 
authority and willingness to apply the necessary force in order to deprive the warlord of 
his access to resources, and also to force him to the negotiating table.  A subsidiary 
outcome of the sufficient application of force by peace troops is the creation of security 
and a sense of predictability in an environment where little previously existed.  In other 
words, the use of force engenders a stable political climate, which is necessary for the 
improved governance issues to set in with any permanence.   
 In such a complex situation, it follows that intervenors must do more than just 
sustain a weak government.  A long-term perspective readily substantiates the necessity 
of establishing a viable political system.  This ultimately entails fostering within the 
people a sense of legitimacy toward the government and a corresponding sense of 
nationalism.  What this means is that, consequently, intervenors cannot mandate a 
political structure but instead must cultivate the appropriate conditions such that an 
accountable government develops and the citizenry is engaged.  Finally, owed to the 
multi-faceted approach required to bring about such a demanding goal, institutional 
reconstruction must be conducted under the auspices of a centralized coordinating 
agency. 
Perhaps the most important of the aforesaid conclusions is the need to recognize 
that warlords have an intrinsic interest in continuing the conflict because cessation of 




fight to win, but only to sustain the instability by which they thrive.  For that reason, 
intervenors must identify warlords’ assets and then appropriately target them. 
In Sierra Leone’s case, weapons were incorrectly initially identified by 
UNAMSIL as the warlord’s principal source of power.  In reality, weapons were only the 
means to obtain and retain control of diamonds.  This misperception led to reneged peace 
accords and cost the lives of early intervenors. 
To be sure, reducing the number of weapons available correspondingly reduces 
the possibility of combat, and for that reason appeared to be a valid goal in Sierra Leone.  
However, unless the way to get more weapons is also curtailed that objective is pointless.  
Once intervenors recognized that disarmament was futile without also disconnecting a 
warlord from his resources the peace process took a huge step forward.  The obvious 
conclusion for intervenors is to not only disarm the combatants but also deny them the 
method for rearmament. 
Although United Nations’ sanctions did not stamp out diamond smuggling, it did 
wrestle control of the diamonds out of the hands of the rebels.  The UN is currently 
endeavoring to recapture this resource as revenue for the legitimate government by 
encouraging effective administrative oversight of the industry.  Moreover, sanctions 
against other countries implicated in the illicit diamond trade further cut RUF access to 
international monies.  The Sierra Leone case, therefore, demonstrates that attacking 
warlords’ resources can be effectively accomplished with a multi-faceted approach 
involving international sanctions, diplomacy, and traditional military operations. 
Concerning military operations in a peace mission, intervenors in warlord 
situations cannot be reluctant to use force.  When UNAMSIL failed to take aggressive 
action in response to its troops being taken hostage, rebel forces moved toward Freetown.  
They would likely have overrun the UN troops had the British not immediately deployed 
soldiers to Sierra Leone.  The analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that decisive British 
military action demonstrated that international intervenors were committed and serious 
about peacebuilding, which was important toward establishing stability.  More generally, 
what this suggests is that in international interventions in warlord situations, a little force 




force when its soldiers were taken hostage.  Britain’s demonstration of force and 
negligible casualties drew positive attention to Sierra Leone’s case, while publicizing 
intervenors’ resolve among Sierra Leoneans.  In view of the above, a warlord situation 
will almost always require a heavy-handed peace enforcement mission with peace-
making aspects dovetailed onto it.  Once the conflict is adequately subdued, then the 
peace process can make headway toward improving the political system. 
Honing a viable political system will not be possible without recapturing the 
government’s revenue base.  Redirecting the profitable diamond industry in Sierra Leone 
through the government will allow the government to expand its domain beyond the 
capital.  Currently, most social services outside the capital and a few other main cities are 
provided by philanthropic non-governmental organizations, or they are not provided at 
all.  As the government takes in revenue it should make a determined effort to extend its 
reach throughout all parts of its territory.  This will show the people that the government 
of Sierra Leone is putting back into the country what it is receiving, rather than filling big 
men’s pockets.   
The immediacy of the government’s rebuilding of social services and 
infrastructure has a positive double effect.  The first is that it causes the people to look 
toward Freetown with renewed faith in their government.  In other words, it plants the 
seeds of legitimacy.  The second benefit is also reinforcing.  Improving distributions out 
of the capital conversely improves flows into the capital—so long as the government has 
control of its borders. 
This portion of the recovery is critical.  The intervenors have taken control of 
warlords’ resources and are trying to put the assets back into the hands of the 
government.  At the same time, they are keeping a wary eye on government, such that it 
properly makes use of its revenue earnings.  In other words, intervenors are propping up 
the weak state while maintaining their guard against patrimonial influences that might 
create another shadow state.  This is precisely what it should be doing, and what it must 
continue to do in the time coming. 
Congruent to getting the government to put back into its society rather than just 




In addition to deploying police and other government officials to the limits of the 
country, elections were recently held under the attentive eye of government voting 
officials and police, who were likewise watched and assisted by foreign agencies.  With 
the successful elections of May 2002, in which President Kabbah was reelected with 70% 
of the vote, international intervenors’ job might appear to be complete.  However, Sierra 
Leone’s slow decline into warlordism demonstrates that an election is not the end, but 
only a means of persuading the groups within society to express their differences at the 
ballot box rather than with force.  Peaceful elections do not mark the end of the 
peacebuilding process.  “‘The last time we had elections [in 1996] everyone thought 
things were going to be OK,’ said Sieh Mansaray, 49, whose right hand was chopped off 
by the rebels in 1998.  ‘But then the war started again.’”116  Intervenors will have to 
remain longer than elections in order to ensure that peaceful adherence to the formal 
political institutions can be sustained, thus coincidentally preventing a hegemonic regime 
from taking root.   
To be sure, political favors are inherent in all politics.  The difference between the 
good and the bad, however, is the degree to which politicians are compelled to abide by 
the rules and procedures of their political institutions rather than making them up for their 
own benefit.  Conformity and deference to the political institution shrinks the 
unpredictability which is part and parcel of hegemonic regimes and their more corrupt 
derivative, patrimonial networks. 
Intervenors will have to continue to nourish Sierra Leonean politics as an 
institution, encouraging concession over intransigence.  This is not a quick, cursory task 
but will have to be sustained over time, with the short run being defined as the next few 
years.  The idea is to develop durability within the political institution while having 
Sierra Leone gradually regain control over its own life.  Eventually, as the government is 
able to more capably perform for its society, and as the interactions of government and 
society tend toward decency and mutual acceptance, a sense of nationalism will be 
generated that will be the true mark of success for the peacebuilding process. 
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Fittingly, there is an inherent longevity to such a comprehensive mission.  
Intervenors’ accomplishments thus far have existed mostly in the peace enforcement and 
peacemaking realms, but with increasing progression into the peacebuilding sphere.  
Each passing day brings greater achievement for the intervenors as peacebuilders.  Great 
Britain took into account the lengthy, vital time that would be required to succeed before 
it became involved.  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan likewise understands the lengthy 
time requirement for the task at hand. 
As stated in my last report (S/2001/1195), the elections will not by 
themselves provide a lasting solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone.  
Without well-established State institutions throughout the country, and 
security agencies that are capable of defending the country from both 
internal and external threats, the stability so far achieved in Sierra Leone 
will remain vulnerable.  In the period immediately following the elections, 
the efforts of the newly elected government and the international 
community must therefore focus on peace consolidation.  Urgent attention 
will need to be paid to the unfinished aspects of the peace process, 
particularly the extension of State authority, the reintegration of ex-
combatants and the restoration of the Government’s control over diamond 
mining.  Those efforts will need to be complemented by the reactivation of 
the judicial system, the strengthening of the law enforcement agencies, the 
restoration of basic public services and recovery efforts throughout the 
country.117  
In addition to the fundamental enforcement role of UN diamond sanctions 
discussed above, UNAMSIL has played a crucial coordinating role.  Installing OCHA as 
the coordinating agency among the various and diverse assistance groups has ensured a 
more coherent, rotund use of available aid.  The implication points to the need for 
synchronization among the various interest groups.  For example, the Sierra Leone 
Association of NGOs (SLANGO) reports that there are 145 NGOs operating in the 
country, to include 16 international organizations.118  Considering the breadth of purpose 
of these NGOs—education, human rights, social welfare, health and sanitation, micro-
finance, skills promotion, refugee and displace persons’ assistance, agriculture, to name 
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but a few—it is easy to see the necessity of a coordinating body to ensure that all oars are 
rowing the boat in the same direction. 
B. CONSOLIDATING GAINS, AND LAYING A FOUNDATION FOR 
FUTURE STABILITY 
This thesis has argued that the UNAMSIL/Great Britain intervention in Sierra 
Leone has been largely successful.  Despite the difficulties of a long-term involvement, 
reduction in commitment could result in the loss of any gains made and the consequential 
return at a later time to start over.  Due to the enticement diamonds offer on account of 
their value in the world market, the ultimate cost of near-term withdrawal will potentially 
be a renewal of offensive operations and, subsequent to that, intervenors having to retrace 
steps already taken.  For that reason the international community must remain committed 
to and involved in Sierra Leone.  This may become difficult as the sum of the 
expenditures continues to grow and other priorities arise.   
If state-building initiatives are not carried through, the progress made thus far 
could still be lost.  This means a comprehensive peacebuilding mission might take years 
of commitment.  Peacebuilders therefore must be given adequate time to foster a viable 
and stable political process characterized by compromise, where competition among local 
actors is carried out purely in the political realm rather than with force.  Inability to 
institute a political system that achieves legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry will allow 
seeds to germinate within potential fissures and widen latent divides.  Among these seeds 
are the holdover powerful personalities from previous times. 
The question of legitimacy is perhaps the most significant objective of the entire 
peacebuilding process.  Concomitant with the need for good governance is the necessity 
to give the people reason to believe in their government.  Legitimacy previously 
bestowed upon charismatic leaders has to be redirected to the state as an institution.  
Once institutionalized legitimacy sets in, the populace’s confidence in their security will 
be renewed.  Only in this fertile soil can a sense of nationalism, which is the ultimate 
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